With Yom Kippur recently celebrated, Bruce Thompson gave an interesting presentation on the Yom Kippur War, fought in October 1973. The Yom Kippur war was a seminal conflict for Israel. But then which isn’t? Egypt and Syria had been looking for a face saver following their decisive defeat in 1967. Their arms build up in the aftermath of that war was dismissed by Israel’s intelligence agencies based on the assumption that they would not want to repeat their 1967 humiliation.
Sadat fuelled this complacency by repeatedly threatening military action in the months leading up to the invasion without following through. Despite reports of unusually high concentrations of military troops near the border and even a warning from a high-ranking spy, Israel chose to do nothing. Later the world learnt that this decision was in part based on a lack of US Support for a pre-emptive strike. The US wanted a political advantage, the moral high ground by allowing the Arabs to attack first. How influential this actually was, continues to be debated.
The Egyptians intended a limited war with the goal of winning control of both banks of the Suez Canal under the protective umbrella of a Anti-Aircraft Missile network built on the Western Bank of the Canal. Without air superiority, their plan originally intended to avoid pressing deeper into Israeli territory. The Syrians intended to seize back the Golan Heights.
Egypt and Syria invaded on October 6. Military surprise was achieved and the Arabs fulfilled their objectives to their schedule. Israel suffered heavy losses as they encountered new technologies introduced since the 1967 war: sophisticated SAM batteries and portable anti-tank AT-3 Sagger wire-guided anti-tank missiles. Egypt departed from its original plan and sent its troops beyond its SAM umbrella which ultimately led to its defeat. The Syrians were not able to make their objectives before the Israeli army was fully mobilized. Eventually the tide turned and Israel began to take Syrian territory. The same was being mirrored on the Southern front. Israeli forces were within 60km of Cairo. With oil prices spiking, there was considerable international pressure to negotiate a cease fire. A cease fire eventually came into force on October 25.
The War resulted in the fall of the Meir government, the early retirement, and/or resignations from Israeli senior officers, an acknowledgement from Egypt that they could not defeat Israel. The war also challenged many American assumptions; the United States initiated new efforts at mediation and peacemaking. These changes paved the way for the subsequent peace process. The Camp David Accords that followed led to the return of the Sinai to Egypt and normalized relations—the first peaceful recognition of Israel by an Arab country. The Egypt-Israel peace pact signed by Sadat and Begin continues to be honoured today. The Arab World, which had been humiliated by the lopsided rout of the Egyptian–Syrian–Jordanian alliance in the Six-Day War, felt psychologically vindicated by early successes in the conflict. In Israel, despite impressive operational and tactical achievements on the battlefield, the war effectively ended its sense of invincibility and complacency. Egypt continued its drift away from the Soviet Union and left the Soviet sphere of influence entirely. New tactics were also developed to counter new SAM missile and portable anti-tank missile technologies.
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Barry Thompson is Vice-President of NZFOI and has been a member for over 20 years. A staunch supporter of Israel, he is also has a keen interest in Military History.
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