Why Gaza’s Conflict Feels Impossible to Resolve
Sustainable peace in Gaza will not come from slogans or quick diplomatic fixes. Conflict theory reminds us that some conflicts become existential—where one side believes its survival requires the destruction of the other. The sociologist Ali Alghafli, studies structural intractability in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. He notes that both societies can become “entrapped in a perpetuating cycle of fighting for their perceived right to national existence.” When one actor insists the conflict is existential, the opposing side is forced into existential behaviour, even if it did not choose that framing.
How Hamas’s Ideology Blocks Coexistence
This is the dynamic Israel faces with Hamas and the wider Muslim Brotherhood movement. Hamas’s charter, rhetoric, and actions openly reject coexistence and frame the struggle as a religiously mandated effort to eliminate Israel. The strategic scholar Daniel Sobelman, specialises in asymmetric conflict. He writes that Hamas increasingly viewed Israel’s destruction as a realistic strategic objective, culminating in its attempt to “plunge Israel into an existential war.” Conflict theory tells us that as long as one actor insists on an existential war, coexistence becomes structurally impossible. Peace requires changing the structure of the conflict, not simply urging goodwill.
History Shows Existential Conflicts Can Still Find Peace
History, however, offers encouragement. Northern Ireland, South Africa, Colombia, and even Israel’s peace with Egypt show that existential conflicts can transition into stable coexistence. In each case, peace emerged only when the existential actor either moderated, lost capability, or was replaced by a governing authority with non‑eliminationist goals. Alghafli’s work reinforces this pattern: structural change, not sentiment, is what breaks cycles of existential fear.
Pathway One: Removing the Means to Wage Existential War
Applied to Gaza, conflict theory identifies three realistic pathways to sustainable peace. First, Hamas must lose the military capability to pursue its existential aims. Sobelman’s research on hybrid warfare shows how non‑state actors impose “rules of the game” on stronger states by maintaining the ability to regenerate and strike. Removing Hamas’s military infrastructure would break this dynamic. When an actor cannot credibly pursue maximalist goals, the conflict shifts from existential to political. Cold coexistence becomes possible.
Pathway Two: Ideological Moderation—The Least Likely Route
The second pathway is ideological moderation within Hamas. This is how the IRA and PLO eventually moved from armed struggle to political engagement. But for Hamas, whose identity is built around sacred‑text absolutism and resistance until victory, moderation is historically unlikely. Sobelman’s analysis reinforces this: Hamas’s strategic vision is tied to existential resistance, not political compromise. Conflict theory treats this pathway as theoretically possible but practically remote.
Pathway Three: Replacing Hamas with a Responsible Authority
The third pathway is the emergence of a new governing authority in Gaza. Sustainable peace requires a Palestinian leadership that is not committed to Israel’s destruction and is capable of governing without militant coercion. The Israeli strategist Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, writes extensively on Israel’s security doctrine. Hacohen argues that Israel must recognise Hamas’s existential framing and engage actors who do not share that worldview. This pathway mirrors transitions seen in Lebanon after its civil war and in South Africa after apartheid.
How Trump’s Board of Peace Fits This Pathway
President Trump’s Board of Peace initiative is an example of this third pathway being attempted in real time. The Board’s charter—ratified in January 2026 and supported by a coalition of international actors—aims to create a governing and reconstruction framework for Gaza that is not controlled by Hamas. Its stated goals include demilitarisation, governance reform, and large‑scale rebuilding, all under an authority committed to coexistence rather than eliminationist ideology.
Conflict theory would describe this as an effort to remove the existential actor from governance and replace it with a structure capable of sustaining peace. The key question, however, is whether the Board can actually meet the three structural conditions required for coexistence.
Can the Board Establish Legitimate Local Leadership?
This is the hardest hurdle. Gazan society has been shaped for decades by Hamas’s political, social, and religious networks. Any new authority must be seen as authentically Palestinian, not externally imposed. Alghafli’s work on conflictive social structures shows how deeply embedded identity networks sustain conflict. The Board’s success depends on whether it can cultivate leaders with genuine local credibility. This is possible, but far from guaranteed.
Can the Board Prevent Hamas from Reconstituting Itself?
This condition is achievable only if regional actors—especially Egypt—cooperate in sealing borders, restricting arms flows, and dismantling underground networks. Sobelman’s analysis of asymmetric deterrence highlights how Hamas exploits regional seams to rebuild capacity. The Board has a chance here: its mandate includes security coordination with states that have both the capability and the incentive to prevent Hamas’s return. This condition is difficult, but structurally plausible.
Can the Board Secure Regional Cooperation?
This is the Board’s strongest advantage. Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have all signalled interest in a post‑Hamas Gaza that is stable, demilitarised, and economically viable. Hacohen’s writing emphasises that Israel’s security environment is shaped by regional alignments; if these states continue to support the Board’s framework, it will have the regional scaffolding needed to sustain political transition.
Taken together, conflict theory would judge the Board of Peace’s chances as tangible but highly conditional. It cannot guarantee coexistence, but it is attempting the only pathway that has ever worked in other existential conflicts: replacing the maximalist actor with a governing authority committed to peace. If the Board succeeds in even two of the three structural conditions, it could create the first genuinely sustainable peace architecture Gaza has seen in decades.
Why Israel Cannot Unilaterally Create Peace
Conflict theory’s central insight is that peace is not achieved by asking Israel to “show restraint” or “take risks for peace.” Peace becomes possible only when the existential framing is removed from the conflict system. Israel cannot unilaterally choose coexistence while facing an actor committed to its elimination. Sustainable peace requires transforming the conditions that make the conflict existential in the first place.
A Hopeful but Realistic Path Forward
For Christians who care deeply about peace, justice, and the wellbeing of both Israelis and Palestinians, conflict theory offers a sober but hopeful message: peace is achievable, but only when the structures that reward perpetual conflict are dismantled. When the existential threat is removed—whether through military defeat, ideological change, or political replacement—coexistence becomes not only possible, but durable.
The Future Depends on Changing the Structure, Not the Slogans
Sustainable peace in Gaza will come when the people of Gaza are governed by leaders who seek life rather than destruction, and when Israel can engage a neighbour who accepts its right to exist. Conflict theory does not promise easy answers, but it does show a clear path: change the structure, and peace can follow.
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NZFOI
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