Call it what it was: Genocide

The atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7 were shocking not only in scale but in intent. Thousands of terrorists crossed into Israel, murdering families in their homes, burning civilians alive, kidnapping children and the elderly, and targeting entire communities because of who they were. As the world tried to absorb the horror, a difficult but necessary question emerged:  Do Hamas’s actions meet the legal definition of genocide?

The word “genocide” carries enormous weight, and international law defines it with precision. When the events of October 7 are viewed through the lens of the UN Genocide Convention, the picture that  emerges is disturbingly clear:  the attack fits the core elements of genocide.

What the Genocide Convention Says

The 1948 Convention defines genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Jews fall into all three of those categories:
they are a religious group, an ethnic group, and in many contexts a national group.
That alone places them squarely within the Convention’s protected categories.

Targeting Jews as Jews

The October 7 attack was not a military operation. It was a deliberate assault on Jewish civilians: families in their homes, children in their bedrooms, elderly people in wheelchairs, festival‑goers at a music event, and entire kibbutzim that are overwhelmingly Jewish communities. The attackers did not distinguish between combatants and civilians. They sought out Jews specifically, killing them “as such,” which is the exact language of the Genocide Convention.

This isn’t just an interpretive claim. Leading genocide scholars and jurists have already described the attack in these terms.

Leading genocide scholars and jurists have already described the October 7 attack in terms consistent with genocidal intent.

Gregory Stanton, founder of Genocide Watch, stated that “Hamas’s attack was genocidal. They targeted Jews because they were Jews.” Source: Stanton interview with The Jerusalem Post, 12 Oct 2023; Genocide Watch public statement, Oct 2023.

Irwin Cotler, former Canadian Justice Minister and a leading human‑rights jurist, wrote that the atrocities “bear the hallmarks of genocidal intent” and reflect Hamas’s “genocidal antisemitism.” Source: Irwin Cotler, Times of Israel, 15 Oct 2023; Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs briefing, Oct 2023.

William Schabas, one of the most cited genocide‑law scholars, explained that if the intent to destroy Jews as such—even in part—is established, then the acts of October 7 fall within the legal definition of genocide. Source: William Schabas interview with Haaretz, 20 Oct 2023; Schabas commentary in JusticeInfo, Nov 2023.

David Scheffer, the first U.S. Ambassador‑at‑Large for War Crimes, similarly noted that the deliberate killing of Jewish civilians by Hamas can constitute genocidal acts, provided that the requisite intent to destroy the group is demonstrated. Source: Scheffer interview with PBS NewsHour, 18 Oct 2023; Scheffer analysis in Just Security, Oct 2023.

Yehuda Bauer, one of the most respected Holocaust and genocide scholars alive, was even more direct: “Hamas’s ideology is genocidal, and October 7 was an expression of that ideology.” Source: Bauer interview with Ynet, 22 Oct 2023; Bauer remarks at Hebrew University panel, Nov 2023.

Aharon Barak, former President of Israel’s Supreme Court and a judge at the International Criminal Court, stated that Hamas’s attack was aimed at Jews as Jews, which he described as the essence of genocidal intent. Source: Barak interview with Der Spiegel, 27 Oct 2023; Barak remarks in ICC press briefing, Nov 2023.

These are not political commentators. They are among the most authoritative voices in international law and genocide studies.

Genocidal Acts in Practice

The Genocide Convention lists specific acts that qualify when paired with genocidal intent. Hamas’s actions match several of them: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily and mental harm, and forcibly transferring children through hostage‑taking. International tribunals have repeatedly held that targeting a geographic subset of a protected group — such as Jews in southern Israel — still qualifies as genocide “in part.”

The pattern on October 7 resembles other cases where courts have found genocide, such as Srebrenica in 1995 and ISIS’s attacks on the Yazidis in 2014. In both examples, the perpetrators did not attempt to wipe out the entire group globally — only a part of it. Yet courts still ruled the acts genocidal. The same legal logic applies to Hamas.

Sometimes people mix up being deliberate with intent. 

Under the Genocide Convention, being deliberate is not the same as the legal requirement of intent (specifically genocidal intent, or dolus specialis). The Convention requires a very specific, purpose‑based intent to destroy a protected group — far beyond merely acting deliberately or foreseeably.
 

Why This Matters

Calling something “genocide” is not about rhetoric. It is about accurately naming the crime, understanding the intent behind the violence, recognizing the vulnerability of the targeted group, and clarifying the obligations of the international community. If the October 7 attack meets the definition —  and the evidence strongly suggests it does — then the world has a responsibility to acknowledge it.

A Final Reflection

The Genocide Convention sets a high bar, but Hamas’s actions on October 7 meet its core criteria. The victims were a protected group. They were targeted because of their identity. The acts committed — mass killing, torture, hostage‑taking, and the targeting of children — are explicitly listed as genocidal acts. And Hamas’s own ideology and statements demonstrate intent to destroy Jews, at least in part.

Whether international courts ultimately rule on this is a separate question. But from a legal and moral standpoint, the October 7 massacre fits the definition of genocide far more clearly than many historical cases that have been recognized as such.

ICJ did not say there was a plausible case for Genocide in Gaza — BBC Hardtalk

On April 25, 2024, Jane Donoghue, who was President of the International Court of Justice in January, when it was reported that the Court had found there was a plausible case for Israel to answer for alleged violation of the Genocide Convention, was interviewed on BBC Hardtalk.

In this Hardtalk interview, Donoghue walks back that common belief that it had decided there was a plausible case against Israel of committing genocide:

Q. Would it be fair to say and I’m no lawyer, and many people watching and listening will not be lawyers, but would it be fair to say that the key point that you made your initial order and ruling upon was whether or not there was a plausible case that should be taken on by the court of genocide in the case of Israel’s actions in Gaza after October 7th, and you quite clearly decided that there was a plausible case. Is it right to say that that was what you decided?

A. You know, I’m glad I have a chance to address that because the court test for deciding whether to impose measures uses the idea of plausibility, but the test is the plausibility of the rights that are asserted by the applicant, in this case South Africa. So the court decided that the Palestinians had a plausible right to be protected from genocide, and that South Africa had the right to present that claim in the court. It then looked at the facts as well, but it did not decide, and this is something where I’m correcting what’s often said in the media, it didn’t decide that the claim of genocide was plausible. It did, it did emphasize in the order that there was a risk of irreparable harm to the Palestinian right to be protected form genocide, but it — the shorthand that often appears which is that there’s a plausible case of genocide isn’t what the court decided.

Source: HonestReporting (@honestreporting) • Instagram photos and videos

What is Genocide — The Economist

On January 11th South Africa will bring a case before the UN’s International Court of Justice accusing Israel of committing a genocide in Gaza. Palestinians have accused Israel of the same crime, as have the country’s long-standing enemies, such as Iran. But it is a sign of the mounting outrage at Israel’s offensive in the territory that the allegation is being heard increasingly from other countries.

Protesters and commentators in the West use the term too. Craig Mokhiber, director of the New York office of the un High Commissioner for Human Rights, wrote on October 28th that “This is a text-book case of genocide.” Israel has both denied committing genocide and accused Hamas of the crime. Gilad Erdan, Israel’s permanent representative to the UN, said on October 26th that “This is not a war with the Palestinians. Israel is at war with the genocidal Hamas terrorist organisation.” The president of Israel, Isaac Herzog, calls the South African allegations “preposterous”. What exactly is genocide, and how, if at all, is the term applicable to the current conflict?

In December 1948, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the un adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The convention defines a genocide as acts intended “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. Contrary to the common understanding of the term, the un says not only killing counts. “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction” does too, as does inflicting “serious bodily or mental harm”, “measures intended to prevent births”, and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. Categorising atrocities as genocide has legal implications. The International Criminal Court is able to indict someone for the crime, for example.

Interpretations of the convention differ because it is so broadly framed. So which atrocities constitute genocide? The systematic murder of 6m Jews by the Nazis was genocide. The organised butchery of perhaps 500,000 ethnic Tutsis by Hutu militias in Rwanda in 1994 was too. In both cases the intent, to destroy a people, was clear. Yet the case of Darfur, in Sudan, where about 300,000 people died in the years after fighting broke out there in 2003, is less clear. America called this a genocide. But in 2005 a UN commission concluded that Sudan’s government had “not pursued a policy of genocide” (although some individuals may have acted with “genocidal intent”). Donald Trump’s administration called the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang a genocide but others disagreed. This newspaper concluded that China’s persecution of the Uyghurs was “horrific”, but not genocidal.

By the UN definition, Hamas is a genocidal organisation. Its founding charter, published in 1988, explicitly commits it to obliterating Israel. Article 7 states that “The Day of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight Jews and kill them”. Article 13 rejects any compromise, or peace, until Israel is destroyed. Hamas fighters who burst into Israel on October 7th and killed almost 1,200 Israelis (and other nationalities) were carrying out the letter of their genocidal law.

Israel, by contrast, does not meet the test of genocide. There is little evidence that Israel, like Hamas, “intends” to destroy an ethnic group—the Palestinians. Israel does want to destroy Hamas, a militant group, and is prepared to kill many civilians in doing so. While some Israeli extremists might want to eradicate the Palestinians, that is not a government policy.

Neither do the Israelis display any obvious intent to prevent Palestinian births. But those who accuse it of genocide, such as South Africa, point to the large number of civilians killed, at least 23,000 so far, and claim its blockade of the strip meets the “conditions-of-life” criterion. The Israelis have clearly inflicted “serious bodily or mental harm” on the Palestinians. They have also displaced large numbers of people from the north of the strip. If those people are not allowed to return, this could be considered a partial destruction of their territory or, as Jan Egeland, a former un head of humanitarian and relief efforts, has warned, a forcible population transfer.

Even if an army’s actions do not pass the threshold of genocide, they can still be wrong. As the un concluded during its report into Darfur, “crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed…may be no less serious and heinous than genocide”.

This article was published as part of the “Economist Explains” series on January 9, 2024.