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→ 30 May 2026
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Why the US and Israel want to prevent a Nuclear Iran

Few issues in global security are as charged, or as misunderstood, as the determination of the United States and Israel to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. To many, it looks like power politics or regional rivalry. In reality, it’s about something far more basic: survival in a world where nuclear weapons and apocalyptic ideology can collide.

The World That Shaped Our View of Nukes

To understand today’s fears, it helps to start in 1945. By mid–World War II, Japan’s military government showed no sign of surrender. American planners expected hundreds of thousands of Allied casualties and millions of Japanese deaths in a full-scale invasion of the home islands. Every serious assessment pointed to a fight to the death.

In that context, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were seen as the least catastrophic option. They forced a rapid surrender and avoided an invasion that could have been far bloodier. Under the law as it existed then, the bombings were not illegal. There were no treaties banning area bombing, no codified proportionality rules, and no legal framework for weapons of such unprecedented destructive power.

Why Those Same Attacks Would Be Illegal Today

Modern Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) take a very different view. Nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate. They cannot be directed only at military targets, they cause long-term radiation effects, and they inflict suffering on a scale that modern humanitarian law does not accept.

Today, proportionality is judged strike by strike, not war by war. You cannot justify killing hundreds of thousands of civilians on the grounds that it might prevent a larger number of deaths later. Civilian immunity is central, and nuclear weapons violate that principle by design. Under the current legal framework, Hiroshima and Nagasaki would almost certainly be considered unlawful, even if the strategic logic were identical.

How Modern Enemies Exploit the Law

Urban warfare adds another layer of complexity. Armed groups such as Hamas, a designated terrorist organisation responsible for severe harm and human rights violations, often fight without uniforms, embed themselves in civilian neighbourhoods, and use human shields. They operate from hospitals, schools, mosques and apartment blocks precisely because they know modern militaries are bound by rules they themselves ignore.

The attacker still has to verify targets, minimise civilian harm and apply proportionality. The defender’s violations do not cancel the attacker’s obligations. This creates a moral and tactical asymmetry: the side that follows the law is constrained; the side that violates it is not.

Most modern jurists accept this imbalance. They argue that weakening these protections would lead to catastrophic civilian suffering. The law is designed to restrain the powerful, not the powerless. It is imperfect, but the alternative is a return to total war.

Why Nuclear Weapons Break the Entire Logic

Nuclear weapons sit outside this framework. They are not just another tool in the arsenal. They are existential. A single detonation can destroy a city, collapse a health system, poison the environment and destabilise an entire region. Once used, the question is no longer who wins a battle, but whether societies can survive.

Deterrence worked in the Cold War because both sides wanted to live. The United States and the Soviet Union feared mutual destruction. The same basic logic applies today with other nuclear states: they may be rivals, but they are not suicidal.

The problem arises when nuclear weapons are paired with apocalyptic ideology. Elements within the Iranian regime frame history and conflict in eschatological terms. Martyrdom, redemptive suffering and the idea of a purifying crisis are not just rhetorical flourishes; they are part of the worldview. Groups like Hamas also draw on themes of martyrdom and sacrificial struggle.

Deterrence assumes that the other side values survival. But if a leadership believes that destruction can serve a divine purpose, or that martyrdom is victory rather than defeat, the entire logic of deterrence begins to fail. You cannot deter someone who is willing to burn the house down while still inside it.

Why the US and Israel Draw a Red Line at Nuclear Iran

This is the core reason the United States and Israel fear a nuclear Iran. It is not simply about regional influence or prestige. A nuclear-armed Iran would not just shift the balance of power; it would undermine the basic assumptions that have kept nuclear weapons unused since 1945.

Even if Iran never launched a nuclear strike, the mere possession of such weapons would radically change the strategic landscape. It would embolden Iran’s network of allied militias and proxies. It would increase the risk of miscalculation. It would make every crisis in the region potentially existential.

The nightmare scenario is not only an Iranian missile. It is also the possibility that nuclear materials, technology or even a device could find their way into the hands of a non-state group with apocalyptic theology and nothing to lose. A state can be deterred by the threat of retaliation against its cities and infrastructure. A dispersed movement with no capital, no conventional economy and a cult of martyrdom is far harder to deter.

The Hard Truth About Law, Power and Survival

The atomic bombings of 1945 were justified in their time because they prevented a far greater catastrophe. Under today’s laws of armed conflict, they would be illegal. Modern law intentionally restrains powerful states, even when adversaries exploit those restraints. Jurists accept this because the alternative is unregulated destruction.

But nuclear weapons break the entire system. They are strategic, not tactical. They are existential, not proportional. When combined with apocalyptic ideology, they create a threat that no legal framework can reliably contain.

That is why the United States and Israel fear a nuclear Iran. It is why they use diplomacy, sanctions, covert action and, at times, force to slow or disrupt its nuclear programme. This is not simply about dominance or prestige. It is about preventing a world in which nuclear weapons sit in the hands of actors who may not be deterred by the prospect of mutual destruction.

In that sense, the red line on a nuclear Iran is not just a strategic preference. It is a civilisational necessity.

And if prevention fails…

But this is also why appeals to LOAC ring hollow in the real world. LOAC can restrain responsible states, but it has no power to restrain a regime that already commits war crimes as doctrine. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, nothing in LOAC prevents it from using them. The only actors bound by proportionality, distinction, and necessity would be the very states trying to stop a nuclear attack — not the regime initiating one.

And once a nuclear weapon is used, the conflict leaves the LOAC framework entirely. A nuclear detonation triggers the right of unrestricted self‑defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. At that point, the priority is not legal theory but preventing a second strike. The likely consequence is regime‑ending retaliation, regional escalation, or nuclear coercion that destabilises the entire Middle East. This is why the world cannot simply “live with” a nuclear Iran. After the first use, every option becomes catastrophic — which is exactly why prevention, not reaction, is the only responsible path.

 

 

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→ 2 March 2026
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The Moral Logic Behind the Strikes on Iran

Iranians and Israelis standing together in solidarity
Iranians and Israelis standing together in solidarity

Why the current attacks on Iran are illegal under international law but justifiable under Just War Theory. Read on to find out the moral logic of the strikes on Iran.

The Legal Frame: Why the Strikes Look Unlawful

International law is deliberately narrow. It allows force only when the UN Security Council authorises it or when a state is acting in self‑defence after an armed attack. Neither condition applies here. Iran had not launched a direct attack on US or Israeli territory, and no Security Council resolution was ever going to pass with Russia and China holding vetoes.

The Charter also prohibits regime change by force. Targeting political leadership crosses into the territory of the crime of aggression. On the legal ledger, the strikes are difficult to defend.

But legality is not the same as morality. And when a regime uses diplomacy as a shield, exports violence through proxies, and pursues long‑term existential goals, the moral analysis shifts.

Why Legality Isn’t the Whole Story

Just War Theory asks whether force is morally necessary to prevent grave harm. It evaluates intention, proportionality, last resort, and the nature of the threat. When applied to Iran, these criteria lead to a very different conclusion from the one international law reaches.

Iran’s post‑1979 regime is not a conventional authoritarian state. It is a revolutionary theocracy whose ideology mandates hostility toward Israel, the United States, and the West. This is not rhetorical theatre. It is written into the constitution, embedded in the IRGC’s mandate, and expressed through decades of proxy warfare.

The aggression is not episodic. It is structural.

A Regime Built for Exporting Conflict

Iran’s leadership has spent 45 years building a network of armed proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, Iraqi militias, Syrian militias, the Houthis—designed to encircle Israel and pressure the United States. These groups are not independent actors. They are instruments of Iranian strategy.

Alongside this, Iran has pursued a nuclear program marked by concealment, sanitised sites, undeclared facilities, and cooperation only when cornered. The IAEA’s reports over two decades show a consistent pattern: Iran advances its program when it can, slows it when pressured, and never fully discloses what it is doing.

Diplomacy becomes a tool for delay, not resolution. And every US election cycle offers a fresh opportunity to reset negotiations, stall for time, and wait for a more favourable administration.

This is not the behaviour of a state seeking coexistence. It is the behaviour of a state preparing for a future confrontation.

The Slow‑Burn Strategy

One of the most compelling interpretations of Iran’s behaviour is that it is pursuing a long‑term, slow‑burn strategy aimed at eventually confronting Israel and the United States on its own terms. That means avoiding premature war, building asymmetric capabilities, exploiting diplomatic cycles, and using negotiations to buy time.

A central pillar of this strategy is the pursuit of nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons function in geopolitics the way a queen functions on a chessboard: they change the entire geometry of the game. States with nuclear weapons are treated differently by the great powers. They gain immunity from regime‑threatening retaliation, freedom to escalate through proxies, and leverage to coerce neighbours.

Once a regime acquires a nuclear deterrent, removing it becomes exponentially harder.

Iran understands this. Its nuclear program is not a sprint; it is a deliberate crawl toward a position where it can no longer be coerced, contained, or confronted. Its restraint is not evidence of moderation. It is evidence of patience.

A regime that wants to survive in the short term but win in the long term behaves exactly like this: calibrated escalation, proxy warfare, nuclear hedging, and ideological consistency across generations.

If this interpretation is correct, the threat is existential even if not immediate.

How Just War Theory Responds to a Threat Like This

Just War Theory distinguishes between preventive war (not allowed) and pre‑emptive action (allowed when a real, advancing threat will soon become irreversible). A slow‑burn existential threat fits the second category when intentions are clear, the threat is growing, diplomacy is being used as deception, and waiting will make defence impossible.

Iran’s behaviour meets those conditions. Its ideology is explicitly hostile. Its proxies wage continuous low‑intensity war. Its nuclear program advances in the shadows. Its diplomacy is a stalling tactic timed to US election cycles. And its long‑term strategy appears aimed at a moment when it can fight from a position of strength.

Under these circumstances, the moral case for action becomes stronger than the legal one.

Does This Justify Regime Change?

Just War Theory allows regime change only when two demanding thresholds are met: the regime itself must be the instrument of aggression, and removing it must be necessary to prevent catastrophic harm.
Iran’s regime is not simply aggressive; it is built for aggression. Its ideology, institutions, and foreign policy are inseparable from its hostility toward Israel and the West. And if the regime is indeed pursuing a long‑term strategy aimed at eventual confrontation—anchored by a future nuclear deterrent—then waiting may simply allow the threat to mature into something irreversible.

In that reading, removing the regime is not imperial overreach. It is pre‑emptive defence against a danger that cannot be neutralised any other way.

Key Takeaway

International law and Just War Theory do not always point in the same direction. Legally, the recent strikes on Iran are difficult to justify. Morally, the case is far stronger. When a regime is ideologically committed to long‑term existential harm, uses proxies to wage continuous war, pursues nuclear capability as the queen on the geopolitical chessboard, and treats diplomacy as a stalling tactic timed to US election cycles, the moral obligation may shift from restraint to action. The uncomfortable truth is that the law may forbid what morality requires.

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→ 30 January 2026
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Call it what it was: Genocide

The atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7 were shocking not only in scale but in intent. Thousands of terrorists crossed into Israel, murdering families in their homes, burning civilians alive, kidnapping children and the elderly, and targeting entire communities because of who they were. As the world tried to absorb the horror, a difficult but necessary question emerged:  Do Hamas’s actions meet the legal definition of genocide?

The word “genocide” carries enormous weight, and international law defines it with precision. When the events of October 7 are viewed through the lens of the UN Genocide Convention, the picture that  emerges is disturbingly clear:  the attack fits the core elements of genocide.

What the Genocide Convention Says

The 1948 Convention defines genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Jews fall into all three of those categories:
they are a religious group, an ethnic group, and in many contexts a national group.
That alone places them squarely within the Convention’s protected categories.

Targeting Jews as Jews

The October 7 attack was not a military operation. It was a deliberate assault on Jewish civilians: families in their homes, children in their bedrooms, elderly people in wheelchairs, festival‑goers at a music event, and entire kibbutzim that are overwhelmingly Jewish communities. The attackers did not distinguish between combatants and civilians. They sought out Jews specifically, killing them “as such,” which is the exact language of the Genocide Convention.

This isn’t just an interpretive claim. Leading genocide scholars and jurists have already described the attack in these terms.

Leading genocide scholars and jurists have already described the October 7 attack in terms consistent with genocidal intent.

Gregory Stanton, founder of Genocide Watch, stated that “Hamas’s attack was genocidal. They targeted Jews because they were Jews.” Source: Stanton interview with The Jerusalem Post, 12 Oct 2023; Genocide Watch public statement, Oct 2023.

Irwin Cotler, former Canadian Justice Minister and a leading human‑rights jurist, wrote that the atrocities “bear the hallmarks of genocidal intent” and reflect Hamas’s “genocidal antisemitism.” Source: Irwin Cotler, Times of Israel, 15 Oct 2023; Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs briefing, Oct 2023.

William Schabas, one of the most cited genocide‑law scholars, explained that if the intent to destroy Jews as such—even in part—is established, then the acts of October 7 fall within the legal definition of genocide. Source: William Schabas interview with Haaretz, 20 Oct 2023; Schabas commentary in JusticeInfo, Nov 2023.

David Scheffer, the first U.S. Ambassador‑at‑Large for War Crimes, similarly noted that the deliberate killing of Jewish civilians by Hamas can constitute genocidal acts, provided that the requisite intent to destroy the group is demonstrated. Source: Scheffer interview with PBS NewsHour, 18 Oct 2023; Scheffer analysis in Just Security, Oct 2023.

Yehuda Bauer, one of the most respected Holocaust and genocide scholars alive, was even more direct: “Hamas’s ideology is genocidal, and October 7 was an expression of that ideology.” Source: Bauer interview with Ynet, 22 Oct 2023; Bauer remarks at Hebrew University panel, Nov 2023.

Aharon Barak, former President of Israel’s Supreme Court and a judge at the International Criminal Court, stated that Hamas’s attack was aimed at Jews as Jews, which he described as the essence of genocidal intent. Source: Barak interview with Der Spiegel, 27 Oct 2023; Barak remarks in ICC press briefing, Nov 2023.

These are not political commentators. They are among the most authoritative voices in international law and genocide studies.

Genocidal Acts in Practice

The Genocide Convention lists specific acts that qualify when paired with genocidal intent. Hamas’s actions match several of them: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily and mental harm, and forcibly transferring children through hostage‑taking. International tribunals have repeatedly held that targeting a geographic subset of a protected group — such as Jews in southern Israel — still qualifies as genocide “in part.”

The pattern on October 7 resembles other cases where courts have found genocide, such as Srebrenica in 1995 and ISIS’s attacks on the Yazidis in 2014. In both examples, the perpetrators did not attempt to wipe out the entire group globally — only a part of it. Yet courts still ruled the acts genocidal. The same legal logic applies to Hamas.

Sometimes people mix up being deliberate with intent. 

Under the Genocide Convention, being deliberate is not the same as the legal requirement of intent (specifically genocidal intent, or dolus specialis). The Convention requires a very specific, purpose‑based intent to destroy a protected group — far beyond merely acting deliberately or foreseeably.
 

Why This Matters

Calling something “genocide” is not about rhetoric. It is about accurately naming the crime, understanding the intent behind the violence, recognizing the vulnerability of the targeted group, and clarifying the obligations of the international community. If the October 7 attack meets the definition —  and the evidence strongly suggests it does — then the world has a responsibility to acknowledge it.

A Final Reflection

The Genocide Convention sets a high bar, but Hamas’s actions on October 7 meet its core criteria. The victims were a protected group. They were targeted because of their identity. The acts committed — mass killing, torture, hostage‑taking, and the targeting of children — are explicitly listed as genocidal acts. And Hamas’s own ideology and statements demonstrate intent to destroy Jews, at least in part.

Whether international courts ultimately rule on this is a separate question. But from a legal and moral standpoint, the October 7 massacre fits the definition of genocide far more clearly than many historical cases that have been recognized as such.

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→ 9 September 2024
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Beware False Moral Equivalence Between Israel and Hamas Militants

Most New Zealanders are unfamiliar with war and its realities. We are even more unfamiliar with the laws that deal with the conduct of war. This article is a good resource that explains in layperson’s terms a high level introduction to how the laws of war differ from those in times of peace.

Hamas’ murder of six Israeli hostages, including a U.S. citizen, is another reminder not only that Hamas remains a genuine danger to Israel, but that it is among the most immoral, illegal, and barbaric armed groups in the world.

War, by its very nature, is a brutal endeavor. The international law that regulates war justifies significant violence that would otherwise be unlawful in peacetime. It also acknowledges the legality of attacks that kill or injure civilians when it is “incidental” to an attack on a legitimate military target and not excessive in relation to the value of attacking that target—one of the most difficult assessments combat leaders must make when deciding whether to conduct an attack. This law, however, categorically prohibits deliberately attacking civilians to kill them, injure them, or terrorize them. Even launching such attacks, regardless of outcome, is absolutely prohibited.

There is, however, one rule of war that is arguably even more fundamental than protecting civilians from deliberate attack: the obligation to treat humanely any captive or detainee.

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→ 29 April 2024
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ICJ did not say there was a plausible case for Genocide in Gaza — BBC Hardtalk

On April 25, 2024, Jane Donoghue, who was President of the International Court of Justice in January, when it was reported that the Court had found there was a plausible case for Israel to answer for alleged violation of the Genocide Convention, was interviewed on BBC Hardtalk.

In this Hardtalk interview, Donoghue walks back that common belief that it had decided there was a plausible case against Israel of committing genocide:

Q. Would it be fair to say and I’m no lawyer, and many people watching and listening will not be lawyers, but would it be fair to say that the key point that you made your initial order and ruling upon was whether or not there was a plausible case that should be taken on by the court of genocide in the case of Israel’s actions in Gaza after October 7th, and you quite clearly decided that there was a plausible case. Is it right to say that that was what you decided?

A. You know, I’m glad I have a chance to address that because the court test for deciding whether to impose measures uses the idea of plausibility, but the test is the plausibility of the rights that are asserted by the applicant, in this case South Africa. So the court decided that the Palestinians had a plausible right to be protected from genocide, and that South Africa had the right to present that claim in the court. It then looked at the facts as well, but it did not decide, and this is something where I’m correcting what’s often said in the media, it didn’t decide that the claim of genocide was plausible. It did, it did emphasize in the order that there was a risk of irreparable harm to the Palestinian right to be protected form genocide, but it — the shorthand that often appears which is that there’s a plausible case of genocide isn’t what the court decided.

Source: HonestReporting (@honestreporting) • Instagram photos and videos

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→ 24 February 2021
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ICC declares jurisdiction over [alleged] crimes in Palestine | The Jurist

The International Criminal Court (ICC) ruled Friday that it has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Palestine. The ICC was established in 2002 and prosecutes genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed around the world. In 2018, Palestine referred possible crimes to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation. In 2020, the Prosecutor sought a ruling of jurisdiction from the Pre-Trial Chamber.

According to Article 12 of the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC, the court may exercise jurisdiction over a crime if “the State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred” is a party to the Statute or otherwise accepts the jurisdiction of the court. Israel argued that Palestine cannot give jurisdiction to the ICC because Palestine is not a sovereign state with jurisdiction over its own territory and nationals.

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Read the full decision

Read Judge Peter Kovac’s dissenting opinion

Q&A Discussion on the decision

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→ 5 June 2020
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Justice for Some: A review

Justice for Some by Noura Erakat was published last year. It is a pro-Palestinian perspective on the Middle East Conflict and International Law.

Most reviews of the article have not been reviews at all but synopses of her material interspersed with the “reviewer’s” cheers and plaudits.

Spotted on the web, here is a pro-Israeli comment on her book that resonated with us:

In “Justice for Some,” Professor Noura Erakat delivers an anti-Israel tirade in the antiquated terms of Marxism.

The main target of Professor Erakat’s assault is the 1922 British Mandate for Palestine (the BMP), the League of Nations law that enabled the creation of the State of Israel. The professor declares that the BMP institutionalized a “racist,” “settler-colonial,” “Apartheid regime” of “oppression” dedicated to the “juridical erasure” of the Palestinian people.

Equally extreme is her view of the Oslo Accords, the set of agreements signed by Israel and the Palestinians in the 1990’s to resolve their longstanding feud. She condemns the Oslo peace process as a continuation of oppressive “colonial practices.”

To combat the alleged colonial oppression, Professor Erakat recommends worldwide “resistance,” described as a blend of economic and legal activism against Israel.

These “coercive pressures,” she contends, would reverse the legal injustices of the past, “dismantle” Israel’s “illegal … colonial infrastructure,” and “liberate” Palestine.

Erakat champions two related forms of resistance: the BDS movement, a boycott campaign “aimed at isolating and shaming Israel;” and “lawfare,” the use of legal tactics to damage a political enemy.

She agrees with BDS leaders that all Palestinians should be allowed to relocate to Israel under a supposed “right of return.”

Regrettably, she omits the fact that such a novel population shift would make Israel a majority-Arab state. Even more disturbing, she enjoys hinting at the prospect of “Palestinian sovereignty” over Israel.

Although the professor maintains that “armed struggle” is available to Palestinians “as a matter of legal right,” she considers BDS and lawfare more effective.

Professor Erakat is not the first Palestinian to assail Israel with the debunked Marxist rhetoric of oppression and resistance. The Palestine Liberation Organization has been spewing the same hate-filled jargon since its founding in 1964.

The only difference between the two manifestos is that one would annihilate Israel through terrorism while the other would do the job through the cynical weaponization of economics and law.

Mainstream scholarship on the BMP confirms the mandate reflected a valid recognition of Jewish self-determination, not an act of colonial oppression.

The law was approved unanimously by a vote of all League of Nations members, not just the “colonial powers.” The great powers did not even share a common political goal, let alone a scheme of oppression.

They competed shrewdly for influence over the territories subject to the League’s mandate system.

Great Britain, the empire that most actively prepared the Jews for statehood, soon became the movement’s most powerful opponent.

Moreover, the Jews could not participate in the League’s BMP vote because they lacked membership in the world body.

Far from serving as agents of any colonial hegemons, the early Zionists immigrated to Palestine to escape the persecution of those regimes.

Another 800,000 Jewish immigrants came to Palestine from the Arab world, including the Jordanian-occupied East Jerusalem and West Bank, where they had suffered a brutal ethnic cleansing.

Jews from all hemispheres migrated to the “Land of Israel” because that was their ancestral home. There, they supplemented indigenous Jewish communities much older than the region’s first Arab dwellings.

Middle East Arabs won the greatest share of mandatory bequests. They gained four large new states: Lebanon; Syria; Iraq; and Transjordan (present day Jordan).

By contrast, their Jewish neighbors had to settle for a much smaller tract because Great Britain reallocated 77% of their League-designated territory to create Transjordan.

The Arabs could have celebrated their vast, newfound sovereignty. But instead, in 1948 they waged a five-state military jihad against Israel and grabbed portions of the Jewish foothold for themselves. That illegal offensive was the real “oppression” that turned the BMP border-drawing exercise into perpetual ethnic strife.

As an international lawyer, Professor Erakat must realize that expunging Israel through terrorism or any other manner would violate the animating principle of the United Nations.

Article 2 of the UN Charter requires nations to settle their differences “by peaceful means” without harming the “sovereign equality,” “security,” “territorial integrity,” or “political independence” of any state.

As a human rights lawyer, Erakat should know better than to portray the existence of Israel as a racist endeavor. That unfounded charge constitutes antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and officially recognized by the US, Canada, 24 EU member states, and five other state signatories.

She compounds the human rights affront by endorsing the BDS movement. A September 23, 2019 UN report titled “Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance” determined that BDS is a form of antisemitism.

A less biased study of legal claims in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have considered both sides of the debate.

The author would have acknowledged Israel’s indigenous rights, self-determination rights, and sovereign rights to the territories in dispute.

She would have weighed possible remedies for the Jewish refugees from East Jerusalem and the West Bank. And she would have backed at least one legal measure to curb terrorism. Sadly, “Justice for Some” demands justice only for Palestinians.

— Anonymous

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→ 19 December 2019
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Why you should know San Remo | IFF

League of Nations Delegates who attended the San Remo Conference, April 1920

Many people know the Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2, 1917 and the U.N. Vote on the Partition Plan on Nov. 29, 1947 as the two main international political events that led to Israel’s Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948.

On December 11, 1917, which was the eve of Hanukkah, General Allenby led the British troops into Jerusalem. Allenby was hailed as the savior of the Jews, especially in light of the fact that one month earlier Britain had issued the Balfour Declaration.

However, there is a misconception that the Balfour Declaration was just a letter of intent, and not a binding legal document. The reason for this misconception is that most people are not aware of the San Remo Conference which took place on April 19, 1920, lasted for seven days and published its resolutions on April 25, 1920. These seven days laid the political foundation for the creation of the 22 Arab League States and the one and only Jewish State of Israel.

The full text of the Balfour Declaration became an integral part of the San Remo resolution and the British Mandate for Palestine, thereby transforming it from a letter of intent into a legally-binding foundational document under international law.

Did the Arabs oppose the creation of a Jewish State at San Remo? The answer is a resounding NO!

Emir Feisal and Chaim Weizmann, 1918.
Dr Chaim Weizmann (left) and Emir Faisal of Iraq

At that time they were focused on the creation of independent Arab states and had no objection to the establishment of a tiny Jewish state in Palestine. This was formalized in the Weizmann-Feisal agreement which led to the League of Nations recognizing the Land of Israel (then Palestine) as the homeland of the Jewish people.

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→ 22 November 2019
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NZFOI welcomes US announcement on Israeli Settlements

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

22 November 2019 CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND — NZ Friends of Israel welcomes the US announcement on Monday November 18, that acknowledges that Israel’s settlements in Judea and Samaria (also known as the West Bank) are not illegal.

Most international law opinions that suggest otherwise are based on a misapplication of the Fourth Geneva Convention which was never written with the Middle Eastern situation in mind.  The original convention expected that the land of a sovereign state was being occupied by another sovereign state. 

This is not the case with the lands of the Middle East.  Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the Second World War, there was no legitimate sovereign over the disputed lands. 

The US announcement affirms the fact that Jews have always been indigenous to the region and are not foreign colonizers. 

With the resurgence of anti-Semitism in many countries of the world, the foresight and wisdom of the League of Nations in mandating the establishment of a Jewish homeland, is unfortunately being vindicated. 

NZ Friends of Israel (www.nzfoi.org, contact@nzfoi.org, ph 027 433 9745) is a registered charity that fights racial prejudice and intolerance by raising awareness of Jewish history and culture.

ENDS

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→ 19 November 2019
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Trump administration says Israel’s West Bank settlements do not violate international law | Washington Post

Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared Monday that Israeli settlements in the West Bank do not violate international law.

Pompeo said the Trump administration, as it did with recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and Israel’s sovereignty over the disputed Golan Heights, had simply “recognized the reality on the ground.”

In remarks to reporters at the State Department, he said the administration was overturning actions taken late in the Obama administration, which for the first time declined to veto a United Nations resolution calling for the dismantlement of West Bank settlements.

Instead, Pompeo said, the administration said it was returning to policy under the administration of Ronald Reagan, who declined to characterize settlements as illegal but called them “ill-advised” and an obstacle to peace.

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