NZFOI Curriculum Refresh Feedback to Ministry of Education

NZFOI Curriculum Refresh Feedback
Anti-Semitic Graffiti Posted in Te Aro, Wellington. 2025.

NZFOI: The Ministry of Education is currently refreshing the Years 1–10 Curriculum and has invited public submissions on its draft proposals. We have taken this opportunity to contribute to the process. Below is the full text of our submission.

24 April 2026
5:00pm Deadline Submission

To:
The Curriculum Refresh Team
Te Tāhuhu o te Mātauranga | Ministry of Education
Wellington, New Zealand

Re: Submission on the Social Sciences Curriculum Refresh (Years 1–10) and the Need for Senior Civics Education (Years 11–13)

Tēnā koutou,

On behalf of the New Zealand Friends of Israel Association Inc., I welcome the opportunity to provide feedback on the Social Sciences Curriculum Refresh. Our organisation is committed to promoting understanding, dialogue, and the safety and wellbeing of Jewish New Zealanders. We appreciate the Ministry’s work in strengthening Social Sciences education and its emphasis on human rights, democratic values, and informed civic participation.

The draft Year 10 Social Sciences sequence already includes the Holocaust within the History strand. This is an important foundation. However, international evidence shows that Holocaust education is most effective when it is not taught as an isolated historical event, but as part of a broader understanding of human rights, democratic systems, and civic responsibility — all of which are central to the Ministry’s Civics and Society strand.

Our submission therefore focuses on strengthening the Holocaust content already present, ensuring historical accuracy, and connecting it to contemporary issues of antisemitism and civic participation. We also strongly recommend the development of a dedicated Civics course for Years 11–13, where students have the maturity to engage with these issues in depth.

1. Strengthening Holocaust Education Within the Year 10 Framework

The draft curriculum correctly includes the Holocaust under World War Two. To ensure clarity, accuracy, and alignment with the Ministry’s stated goals, we recommend:

A. Clarifying the historical specificity of the Holocaust

The Holocaust was the Nazi regime’s systematic attempt to annihilate the Jewish people. Other groups — including Roma, disabled people, Poles, Soviet POWs, LGBTQ+ people, and political dissidents — suffered terribly under Nazism and must be taught with dignity and accuracy. Each group’s experience should be taught distinctly, not collapsed into a single narrative.

This approach aligns with the Ministry’s emphasis on:

  • analysing evidence
  • understanding multiple perspectives
  • recognising injustice
  • learning how human rights frameworks developed

B. Connecting Holocaust education to contemporary antisemitism

Because of antisemitism, a portion of our society is being harassed, intimidated, and sometimes even violently attacked simply for being Jewish. This is a contemporary human rights issue that fits squarely within the Civics and Society strand.

Students should learn:

  • how antisemitism operates today
  • how to recognise antisemitic tropes
  • how conspiracy theories spread
  • how to respond safely and appropriately
  • how to support peers who are targeted
  • how to report incidents
  • how to uphold democratic values and human rights

If we want justice — and surely we do — then we must teach students how to stand up for it.

2. Teaching Students How to Push Back Against Antisemitism

One of the most important objectives of Holocaust and Civics education should be to teach students how to respond safely and appropriately when they encounter antisemitism.

This does not mean confrontation. It means:

  • recognising harmful stereotypes
  • understanding why they are dangerous
  • knowing how to challenge misinformation
  • knowing when and how to seek help
  • knowing how to support classmates who are targeted
  • knowing how to report incidents through appropriate channels

This aligns directly with the Ministry’s commitments to:

  • student wellbeing
  • anti‑bullying frameworks
  • digital citizenship
  • safe school environments
  • the development of confident, connected, actively involved young people

3. The Case for Civics Education in Years 11–13

The Ministry’s draft states that Year 10 Social Sciences “prepares students with the knowledge and practices to access related curriculum subjects for Years 11–13.” This creates a natural pathway for a dedicated senior Civics course, where students have the cognitive maturity to engage with:

  • democratic institutions
  • human rights frameworks
  • extremism and radicalisation
  • propaganda and media manipulation
  • contemporary antisemitism
  • the responsibilities of citizenship

Holocaust education should be a core case study within this senior Civics course, enabling students to connect historical injustice with contemporary civic responsibilities.

Older students are developmentally ready to:

  • analyse complex political and ethical issues
  • understand the consequences of democratic failure
  • evaluate competing perspectives
  • participate meaningfully in civic life
  • prepare for voting and public engagement

A senior Civics course would therefore strengthen the Ministry’s goals of producing informed, thoughtful, and active citizens.

4. Summary of Recommendations

For Years 1–10

  • Strengthen Holocaust content already present in Year 10.
  • Clarify the Holocaust’s historical specificity.
  • Teach the persecution of other victim groups distinctly and accurately.
  • Integrate Jewish life and culture, not only Jewish victimhood.
  • Teach students how to recognise and respond to prejudice.
  • Connect Holocaust education to human rights and democratic values.
  • Provide teachers with training and high‑quality resources.

For Years 11–13

  • Develop a dedicated Civics course.
  • Include Holocaust education as a central case study.
  • Teach contemporary antisemitism, conspiracy culture, and online radicalisation.
  • Teach students how to push back safely and appropriately when they encounter antisemitism.
  • Connect historical lessons to democratic participation and critical media literacy.

5. Key takeaways

Holocaust education is not simply about teaching a historical event. It is about equipping young New Zealanders with the knowledge and moral clarity to recognise antisemitism — a threat that continues to harm Jewish communities today — and to repudiate it wherever it appears.

Because of antisemitism, a portion of our society is being harassed, intimidated, and sometimes violently attacked simply for being Jewish. That is an injustice. A curriculum committed to equity and citizenship must prepare students to recognise injustice and to act.

The Curriculum Refresh is a rare opportunity to strengthen this essential part of our national education. We urge the Ministry to adopt the recommendations above to ensure that Holocaust and Civics education in Aotearoa is accurate, meaningful, and future‑focused — and that it prepares young people not only to understand injustice, but to stand against it.

Ngā mihi nui,

Tony Kan
President
New Zealand Friends of Israel Association Inc.
Charities Commission Registration No: CC 43880

 

Social Media, State Actors, and the Battle for World Opinion on Israel

Over the last five years, social media has transformed from a digital town square into a geopolitical battlespace. Nowhere is this clearer than in the global conversation about Israel. What once unfolded through journalism, diplomacy, and long‑form analysis now happens through 15‑second videos, anonymous accounts, and algorithm‑driven outrage. And while many in the West still treat social media as entertainment, hostile states treat it as a weapon.

The new information battlefield

During the October 7 attacks and the Gaza war that followed, platforms like TikTok, X, Instagram, and Telegram became the primary source of information for millions. But “information” is generous. Much of what went viral was unverified, emotionally charged, or outright fabricated. Israel often found itself responding to false claims within minutes simply to prevent them from hardening into “truth.”

This shift has had measurable consequences. In 2023, for the first time since polling began in 1998, more Americans sympathised with Palestinians than with Israelis. That change did not happen in a vacuum. It was accelerated by digital ecosystems optimised for emotional impact, not accuracy.

State actors are exploiting Western vulnerabilities

Foreign governments have learned that social media allows them to influence Western societies at almost no cost. Russia’s bot networks are well‑documented. China’s algorithmic shaping of TikTok content is now a matter of national‑security concern in the United States. And Iran—often underestimated in this space— has become increasingly sophisticated.

One of the most revealing examples came when Iran shut down its own internet during a 12‑day internal crisis. Almost immediately, the volume of social‑media posts advocating Scottish separatism collapsed. That wasn’t a coincidence. It was a glimpse into how foreign actors seed and amplify divisive narratives abroad. When the servers went dark in Tehran, the “grassroots” Scottish nationalism online suddenly evaporated.

This is the world we now inhabit: a world where adversarial regimes can reach directly into Western societies and widen every existing fault line—political, racial, religious, generational—because division weakens democracies.

The herd instinct and the illusion of consensus

Human beings are social creatures. We instinctively assume that if thousands of people are saying something, it must be true—or at least partly true. Social media exploits this instinct mercilessly.

When users see a flood of posts vilifying Israel or demonising Jews, the sheer volume creates an illusion of consensus. But volume is not evidence. It is often automation.

AI‑driven botnets can generate thousands of posts per minute, each containing a sliver of selective truth wrapped in emotionally charged framing. These posts mimic human behaviour, recycle trending language, and create the impression of a global groundswell. In reality, it may be a handful of operators in Moscow, Tehran, or Beijing pressing a button.

This is not public opinion. It is manufactured perception.

And once people fall into these digital stampedes, they become trapped in algorithmic silos so deep they can no longer see out of them. They stop encountering opposing views. They stop trusting mainstream institutions. They stop believing that disagreement can be honest.

A society that cannot talk to itself cannot defend itself.

War may not interest the West—but war is interested in the West

Many in the West understandably want nothing to do with conflict in the Middle East. But geopolitical adversaries are deeply interested in them. Iran, Russia, and China all view Western freedoms—speech, religion, equality, democratic governance—as existential threats to their own systems.

This is why Iran calls the United States “the Great Satan.” Not because of culture or history, but because a free society is a standing rebuke to tyranny. As long as the West remains free, Iran will continue pursuing nuclear capability and sponsoring proxy groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to destabilise the region and  weaken Western resolve.  And it’s working.  In the last two conflicts in the Middle East, the US has lacked the resolve to complete the mission.  

Tyrannies do not fear Western armies as much as they fear Western ideas.

Weaponising Western empathy

One of the most effective tools used against the West is its own moral instinct. Free societies value compassion, fairness, and human rights. Authoritarian regimes understand this—and exploit it.

They flood social media with emotionally charged content designed to provoke outrage, guilt, or moral confusion. They present themselves as victims while hiding their own abuses. They manipulate Western audiences who assume that everyone values truth the same way we do.

But in many parts of the world, truth is not a virtue—it is a tactic.

How free societies defend themselves without sacrificing freedom

The answer is not censorship. It is discernment.

People must learn to slow down, cross‑check, and seek independent sources. They must look for the overlap between credible accounts rather than trusting the first viral post that appears in their feed. They must understand that not everyone online shares Western values—or Western respect for truth.

We must be as gentle as doves and as wise as serpents.

A free society can survive lies. What it cannot survive is naivety.

Israel’s death penalty: A biblical perspective on the Death Penalty

Israel's death penalty: Chagall's crucifixioin

Israel’s death penalty law has been amended particularly in how it should be applied. We have been asked for a biblical perspective on the death penalty in general.

It’s always controversial — in the West

The death penalty is controversial because it sits at the intersection of justice, morality, and state power. For many people, capital punishment raises the question of whether the state should ever take a life, even in response to the most serious crimes.

Others focus on the risk of error: no legal system is perfect, and a wrongful conviction in a capital case cannot be undone. There is also debate about fairness. Around the world, critics point to uneven application across different populations, court systems, or regions, which can undermine public confidence in equal justice.

Supporters often argue that some crimes are so grave that the strongest possible penalty is justified, but opponents counter that life imprisonment already protects society without crossing a moral line. These tensions make the death penalty a recurring flashpoint in legal and public debate.

Israel’s death penalty before the amendment

Israel’s death penalty has remained almost entirely unused because the legal system was designed to make execution possible in theory but extraordinarily difficult in practice.

For decades, a death sentence in the military courts required a unanimous panel of three judges, all of whom had to be senior officers. This unanimity rule created a built‑in brake: even in severe terrorism cases, a single dissenting judge prevented the sentence.

Alongside this, the regional military commander held broad clemency powers and routinely commuted any death sentence that did emerge. In the civilian system, courts consistently preferred life imprisonment, reflecting a judicial culture shaped by the singular experience of the Eichmann trial, which reinforced the idea that execution should be reserved for uniquely exceptional crimes.

Together, these structural and cultural factors meant the death penalty existed largely as a symbolic provision rather than a practical sentencing option.

Even when prosecutors sought it, the combination of procedural safeguards and institutional caution ensured it was never carried out. This history explains why the new amendment is so significant: it removes the very safeguards that kept the death penalty dormant for more than sixty years.

For those looking for that biblical perspective, here’s a thought-provoking piece:  Carpe Deo: Israel’s death penalty

The Death Penalty Debate: Reading the Law, Not the Hype

Israel’s new “Death Penalty for Terrorists Law, 5786–2026” has generated a wave of commentary, much of it heated and much of it only loosely connected to the text of the law itself.

Claims that the law is “racist” or that it “exempts Israelis from the death penalty” are now circulating widely.

This post does something very simple: it looks at the actual wording of the amendment and the legal framework it sits within. When we do that, a different picture emerges—legally complex, morally serious, but far less sensational than the headlines.

The Death Penalty Is Not New in Israel

A useful starting point: Israel has always had capital punishment on the books.  It exists in both the civilian Penal Law and in military law, and it has been used extremely rarely (famously, Adolf Eichmann). The new amendment does not “introduce” the death penalty.  It changes the conditions under which it may be imposed.

Why Two Court Systems Exist

Since 1967, the West Bank (“the Area”) has been governed under military law, not Israeli civilian law. This is not new, and it is not created by the amendment. It comes from:

  • the Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria – Adjudication of Offenses and Legal Aid), 1967, and
  • the Order Regarding Security Provisions (No. 1651).

Under this framework:

  • Israeli citizens and Israeli residents are tried in civilian courts.
  • Area residents who are not Israeli citizens or residents fall under military jurisdiction.

This is a jurisdictional distinction, not an ethnic one. The amendment simply adds new sentencing rules inside this long-standing structure.

What the Amendment Actually Does

The law creates two distinct sentencing tracks:

  1. A military court track for certain terrorism-related killings by residents of the Area.
  2. A civilian Penal Law track for intentional killing aimed at destroying the State of Israel.

1. The Military Court Track: Residents of the Area

Section 3 applies to:

“A resident of the Area … excluding an Israeli citizen or an Israeli resident.”

If such a person intentionally kills in an act of terrorism, the law states:

“shall be sentenced to death, and this punishment only…”

But the law also provides an exception:

“…if the Military Court finds, for special reasons which shall be recorded, that special circumstances exist… it may impose [life imprisonment].”

The law does not define “special reasons” or “special circumstances”.  That means the military courts will have to develop the standard through case law, as is normal in a common-law system.

In practice, this is a default death penalty with a judicial escape valve.

2. The Penal Law Track: Anyone Who Kills to Destroy the State of Israel

Section 6 amends the civilian Penal Law. It applies to any person—the text contains no exclusions. It covers intentional killing:

“with the aim of negating the existence of the State of Israel.”

The court may impose:

“death or life imprisonment, and one of these punishments only.”

Here, the court has full discretion. This means Israeli citizens—Jewish, Arab, Druze, or otherwise—can face the death penalty under this track.

What the Law Does Not Do

1. It Does Not Remove the Right of Appeal

Nothing in the amendment touches appeal rights. They remain exactly as they are today.

2. It Does Not Differentiate by Race or Ethnicity

The law never mentions race, ethnicity, or religion. Its distinctions are:

  • between military and civilian jurisdiction, and
  • between Area residents and Israeli citizens/residents.

These are legal-status categories, not ethnic ones.

3. It Does Not Exempt Israeli Citizens from the Death Penalty

Under the Penal Law amendment, any person who intentionally kills with the aim of destroying the State of Israel can be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

Why the Debate Has Become So Confused

Much of the commentary has focused only on the military-court provision and ignored the civilian Penal Law amendment. If you look only at Section 3, it is easy to conclude that “Palestinians get the death penalty, Israelis don’t.”

But once both legs of the law are read together, a more accurate picture emerges:

  • Military courts: default death penalty for certain terrorism-related killings by Area residents under military jurisdiction, with a narrow judicial exception.
  • Civilian courts: discretionary death penalty or life imprisonment for anyone who intentionally kills with the aim of negating the existence of the State of Israel.

Towards a More Grounded Conversation

The new death penalty law is serious, weighty legislation. It raises hard moral, legal, and practical questions. Those questions deserve careful discussion.

But that discussion should begin with what the law actually says:

  • It does not introduce the death penalty—it already existed.
  • It creates two sentencing tracks—military and civilian.
  • It establishes a default death penalty in the military track, with a judicial escape valve.
  • It provides discretionary death or life sentences in the civilian track.
  • It does not remove appeal rights.
  • It does not classify defendants by race or ethnicity.
  • It does not exempt Israeli citizens from the death penalty.

In short, the law is not the caricature currently circulating online. Whatever one’s view of the death penalty in principle, the debate should be anchored in the text of the law, not in slogans about it.

This analysis is based on the following translation of the Amendment Bill.

Holocaust Education Is Everywhere — So Why Isn’t It Working?

The Ministry of Education has released its draft Social Sciences curriculum for Year 10. On the face of it, the Holocaust content looks solid: Nazi antisemitism, Kristallnacht, ghettos, mass shootings, extermination camps, resistance, liberation — the usual landmarks.

And yet, something isn’t adding up. Around the world, Holocaust education has expanded dramatically over the past two decades, but antisemitism hasn’t gone away. In many places, it’s getting worse. That’s not just an overseas problem. Jewish New Zealanders are being shouted at, pushed around, and occasionally assaulted simply for being Jewish. You don’t need a PhD in history to see that something isn’t working.

So what’s going on? And what might we need to think about here in Aotearoa?

What the experts keep saying

If you look at the work of people who’ve spent their lives studying this — Yehuda Bauer, Deborah Lipstadt, Matti Friedman, the teams at UNESCO, IHRA, Yad Vashem — a pattern emerges.

They’re not arguing over details. Their concern is that we teach the history, but we don’t teach students how to recognise the same patterns when they appear today.

Students often get the events, but not the underlying logic. They learn the horror, but not the warning. They learn what happened, but not how to recognise the same currents when they appear in their own world — in jokes, in slogans, in conspiracy theories, in the way people talk about “them.” Students learn Jewish death, not Jewish life.  Jews are often presented as victims, not as a living people with culture, agency, and continuity.

These gaps matter.

The Holocaust was meant to destroy the Jews

One point the experts are almost unanimous on: the Holocaust needs to be taught with clarity. It was the Nazi project to annihilate the Jewish people. That’s the core of it.

Other groups suffered terribly under Nazism — Roma, disabled people, political dissidents, LGBTQ+ people, and others — and their stories deserve to be taught properly, in their own right. But when everything gets folded into one big, blurred narrative, students lose the ability to understand why Jews were targeted then, and why antisemitism still has such a long half‑life now.

Clarity isn’t exclusion. It’s accuracy. And accuracy is what lets students make sense of the present.

The missing skill: what to do when you see antisemitism

One thing that rarely appears in any curriculum — here or overseas — is the practical side. Students need to know what to do when they encounter antisemitism.

Not confrontation. Not speeches. Just the basics:

  • spotting harmful stereotypes
  • understanding why they’re dangerous
  • knowing how to challenge misinformation
  • knowing when to get help
  • knowing how to support someone who’s being targeted

This isn’t a political agenda. It’s the same logic behind anti‑bullying programmes and digital citizenship. If we want young people to recognise injustice, they need tools, not just stories.

A thought for New Zealand: what about senior Civics?

The Ministry’s draft curriculum stops at Year 10, but it also says Year 10 Social Sciences prepares students for senior subjects. That opens a door.

By Years 11–13, students are ready for the deeper questions:

  • how democracies fail
  • how propaganda works
  • how prejudice becomes policy
  • how extremism spreads
  • how human rights frameworks were built
  • how to participate meaningfully in civic life

This is where Holocaust education becomes more than history. It becomes civic literacy — the kind that helps young adults understand the world they’re about to vote in, work in, and live in.

Young people want meaning.  They have a thirst for justice.  A senior Civics course isn’t a radical idea. It’s a practical one.

Some ideas that might be worth considering

After looking at the international research, the Ministry’s draft, and the reality facing Jewish New Zealanders today, a few ideas seem worth putting on the table:

  • Strengthen the Holocaust content already in Year 10 by making the purpose clearer, not just the events.
  • Teach the persecution of other groups distinctly, so their experiences aren’t lost in generalisation.
  • Make the link between historical antisemitism and contemporary antisemitism explicit.
  • Connect students to living Jewish communities.
  • Give students practical tools for responding safely when they encounter prejudice.
  • Explore a senior Civics course where these themes can be taught with the depth and maturity they require.

None of this requires tearing up the curriculum. It’s about sharpening the focus so the history does what it’s meant to do: help young people understand the world they’re stepping into — and their responsibility to stand up for justice and ensure that no community is left to face intimidation, harassment, or violence because of antisemitism.

Tony Kan
President
NZ Friends of Israel Association Inc

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For Israel, The Outrage Only Flows One Way

Cluster munitions indiscriminately scattered over Tel Aviv

Why the Criticism of Israel’s Pre‑Emptive Strike on Iran Feels Selective

Every time Israel takes military action, the global commentary machine fires up instantly. The latest wave of criticism over Israel’s pre‑emptive strike on Iran is a perfect example. Within hours, the familiar words appeared: “escalation,” “overreaction,” “destabilising.”

But something about the conversation feels off. Almost like we’ve all quietly forgotten the context — especially the way Israel was treated during the Gaza war that followed the October 7 attacks.

It’s worth stepping back and looking at the bigger picture.

The Gaza War Set the Tone — and It Wasn’t Balanced

During the Gaza war, Israel was criticised no matter what it did. Too much force, not enough restraint, too slow, too fast — the commentary was contradictory but relentless.

And all of this happened despite the war beginning with the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. Despite Hamas embedding itself inside hospitals, schools, and apartment blocks. Despite Israel issuing evacuation warnings, opening humanitarian corridors, and pausing operations.

The narrative was locked in early: Israel was the problem. Facts struggled to catch up.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Actions Barely Registered

Fast‑forward to the present, and Iran has been doing things that would normally trigger global outrage — yet somehow don’t.

Take the indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Iran has fired ballistic missiles, drones, and even cluster munitions into Israeli cities. Not military installations. Cities. Suburbs. Places where families live.

The global reaction? Muted.

Or consider the cluster munitions themselves. Israel gets criticised for weapons it didn’t use. Iran actually used them, repeatedly, and the world barely blinked.

Then there’s Iran’s habit of attacking countries that aren’t even involved in the conflict. Jordan. Pakistan. Kurdish regions in Iraq. Saudi Arabia. None of these countries were attacking Iran. If Israel did that, the UN would still be in emergency session.

And we can’t ignore the attacks on neutral countries’ commercial shipping. Iranian proxies have targeted tankers belonging to nations with no stake in the conflict, threatening global trade routes and civilian crews. Again, the outrage was strangely quiet.

So Why Is Israel’s Pre‑Emptive Strike Treated as the Outrage?

It’s hard to escape the conclusion that Israel is held to a different standard. Some of that comes from being a democracy. Some from being Western‑aligned. Some from the expectation that Israel should simply absorb attacks without responding.

Justice is meant to be fair.

But expecting any country to sit still while another state fires missiles at its cities isn’t a moral stance. It’s an unrealistic one.

Israel’s pre‑emptive strike didn’t appear out of thin air. It followed months of Iranian attacks, escalating threats, proxy warfare across multiple fronts, and direct missile strikes on Israeli civilians. At some point, any responsible government has to act to protect its people.

Balanced Criticism Is Healthy — Selective Criticism Isn’t

No country is above scrutiny. Israel included. But criticism only has integrity when it’s applied consistently.

If Israel is condemned for defending itself while Iran gets a pass for firing missiles at civilians, using cluster munitions, attacking uninvolved countries, and threatening global shipping, then we’re not dealing with moral clarity. We’re dealing with moral convenience.

And moral convenience doesn’t help anyone — not Israelis, not Palestinians, and not the wider region.

The Moral Logic Behind the Strikes on Iran

Iranians and Israelis standing together in solidarity
Iranians and Israelis standing together in solidarity

Why the current attacks on Iran are illegal under international law but justifiable under Just War Theory. Read on to find out the moral logic of the strikes on Iran.

The Legal Frame: Why the Strikes Look Unlawful

International law is deliberately narrow. It allows force only when the UN Security Council authorises it or when a state is acting in self‑defence after an armed attack. Neither condition applies here. Iran had not launched a direct attack on US or Israeli territory, and no Security Council resolution was ever going to pass with Russia and China holding vetoes.

The Charter also prohibits regime change by force. Targeting political leadership crosses into the territory of the crime of aggression. On the legal ledger, the strikes are difficult to defend.

But legality is not the same as morality. And when a regime uses diplomacy as a shield, exports violence through proxies, and pursues long‑term existential goals, the moral analysis shifts.

Why Legality Isn’t the Whole Story

Just War Theory asks whether force is morally necessary to prevent grave harm. It evaluates intention, proportionality, last resort, and the nature of the threat. When applied to Iran, these criteria lead to a very different conclusion from the one international law reaches.

Iran’s post‑1979 regime is not a conventional authoritarian state. It is a revolutionary theocracy whose ideology mandates hostility toward Israel, the United States, and the West. This is not rhetorical theatre. It is written into the constitution, embedded in the IRGC’s mandate, and expressed through decades of proxy warfare.

The aggression is not episodic. It is structural.

A Regime Built for Exporting Conflict

Iran’s leadership has spent 45 years building a network of armed proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, Iraqi militias, Syrian militias, the Houthis—designed to encircle Israel and pressure the United States. These groups are not independent actors. They are instruments of Iranian strategy.

Alongside this, Iran has pursued a nuclear program marked by concealment, sanitised sites, undeclared facilities, and cooperation only when cornered. The IAEA’s reports over two decades show a consistent pattern: Iran advances its program when it can, slows it when pressured, and never fully discloses what it is doing.

Diplomacy becomes a tool for delay, not resolution. And every US election cycle offers a fresh opportunity to reset negotiations, stall for time, and wait for a more favourable administration.

This is not the behaviour of a state seeking coexistence. It is the behaviour of a state preparing for a future confrontation.

The Slow‑Burn Strategy

One of the most compelling interpretations of Iran’s behaviour is that it is pursuing a long‑term, slow‑burn strategy aimed at eventually confronting Israel and the United States on its own terms. That means avoiding premature war, building asymmetric capabilities, exploiting diplomatic cycles, and using negotiations to buy time.

A central pillar of this strategy is the pursuit of nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons function in geopolitics the way a queen functions on a chessboard: they change the entire geometry of the game. States with nuclear weapons are treated differently by the great powers. They gain immunity from regime‑threatening retaliation, freedom to escalate through proxies, and leverage to coerce neighbours.

Once a regime acquires a nuclear deterrent, removing it becomes exponentially harder.

Iran understands this. Its nuclear program is not a sprint; it is a deliberate crawl toward a position where it can no longer be coerced, contained, or confronted. Its restraint is not evidence of moderation. It is evidence of patience.

A regime that wants to survive in the short term but win in the long term behaves exactly like this: calibrated escalation, proxy warfare, nuclear hedging, and ideological consistency across generations.

If this interpretation is correct, the threat is existential even if not immediate.

How Just War Theory Responds to a Threat Like This

Just War Theory distinguishes between preventive war (not allowed) and pre‑emptive action (allowed when a real, advancing threat will soon become irreversible). A slow‑burn existential threat fits the second category when intentions are clear, the threat is growing, diplomacy is being used as deception, and waiting will make defence impossible.

Iran’s behaviour meets those conditions. Its ideology is explicitly hostile. Its proxies wage continuous low‑intensity war. Its nuclear program advances in the shadows. Its diplomacy is a stalling tactic timed to US election cycles. And its long‑term strategy appears aimed at a moment when it can fight from a position of strength.

Under these circumstances, the moral case for action becomes stronger than the legal one.

Does This Justify Regime Change?

Just War Theory allows regime change only when two demanding thresholds are met: the regime itself must be the instrument of aggression, and removing it must be necessary to prevent catastrophic harm.
Iran’s regime is not simply aggressive; it is built for aggression. Its ideology, institutions, and foreign policy are inseparable from its hostility toward Israel and the West. And if the regime is indeed pursuing a long‑term strategy aimed at eventual confrontation—anchored by a future nuclear deterrent—then waiting may simply allow the threat to mature into something irreversible.

In that reading, removing the regime is not imperial overreach. It is pre‑emptive defence against a danger that cannot be neutralised any other way.

Key Takeaway

International law and Just War Theory do not always point in the same direction. Legally, the recent strikes on Iran are difficult to justify. Morally, the case is far stronger. When a regime is ideologically committed to long‑term existential harm, uses proxies to wage continuous war, pursues nuclear capability as the queen on the geopolitical chessboard, and treats diplomacy as a stalling tactic timed to US election cycles, the moral obligation may shift from restraint to action. The uncomfortable truth is that the law may forbid what morality requires.

How Headlines help Anti‑Israel Bias Escape Scrutiny

Headline push Anti‑Israel Bias

Most people never read past a headline. In the age of scrolling, swiping, and instant reactions, the headline is the story for a huge share of the audience. It shapes the emotional response, sets the frame, and often becomes the public’s memory of the event, regardless of what the article actually says.

That is why headlines matter so much in reporting on Israel. And it is why complaints to the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) and the NZ Media Council so often fail, even when the headline is blatantly misleading or inflammatory.

A recent Stuff story is a perfect example.

The Stuff Headline That Does the Damage

Stuff ran the headline:

“Human rights experts join rising chorus that accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza.”

It is a headline designed to hit hard. It implies a growing, authoritative consensus. It frames Israel as a state facing a swelling global indictment. And it uses the most explosive word in the political vocabulary: genocide.

But the article itself tells a different story. Buried further down, readers learn that:

  • The International Court of Justice has not found Israel guilty of genocide.
  • The UN “experts” are not judges, not investigators, and do not speak for the UN as a whole.
  • The legal question is unresolved and contested.

A more accurate, less inflammatory headline could easily have been:

“UN-appointed experts repeat genocide allegations; legal bodies yet to rule.”

Same facts. Less heat. No distortion. But most readers never get that far. They see the headline, absorb the accusation, and move on.

Why Regulators Keep Saying “Not Guilty”

When NZFOI or others complain about biased headlines, the outcome is depressingly predictable. The BSA and Media Council almost always judge the entire article, not the headline that shaped public perception.

Their reasoning follows a familiar pattern:

  • A “reasonable reader” is assumed to read the whole article.
  • Headlines are allowed to be punchy or provocative.
  • Balance in the body text is treated as a cure for imbalance in the headline.

This approach made sense in the print era, when readers sat down with a newspaper and consumed the whole story. It makes no sense in a digital environment where headlines circulate independently on social media, often without any context at all.

The regulators are evaluating journalism as it exists on paper, not as it is consumed in the real world.

This allows headlines to help anti-Israel bias to escape scrutiny.

What the Research Shows About Headlines

Modern media research is unequivocal:

  • Many readers never click through to the article.
  • Emotional reactions occur at the headline level alone.
  • First impressions formed from headlines persist even when contradicted by the body.
  • Social media amplifies headlines in isolation, without nuance or context.

In other words, a fair body cannot fix a misleading headline. The harm has already happened.

This is especially true for Israel-related reporting, where words like “genocide,” “apartheid,” and “war crimes” carry enormous emotional weight and can inflame public sentiment instantly.

Why This Matters for Israel

Israel is uniquely vulnerable to headline distortion because:

  • Allegations are often presented as facts.
  • Headlines frequently omit legal context.
  • Nuance appears only deep in the article.
  • Social media spreads the headline, not the correction.

The Stuff headline is a textbook case. It primes readers to believe Israel is committing genocide, even though the article itself acknowledges that no court has made such a finding.

The headline becomes the verdict. The article becomes the footnote.

What Needs to Change

New Zealand’s media standards need to catch up with how news is actually consumed.

  • Headlines must be assessed as standalone communications. If the headline misleads, the complaint should be upheld, even if the body is balanced.
  • Newsrooms must stop using headlines as emotional weapons. Accuracy should not be sacrificed for clicks, especially on matters of war and public safety.
  • Regulators must recognise the real-world impact of framing. The “reasonable reader” of 2026 does not behave like the reader of 1996.

Until that happens, misleading headlines about Israel will continue to shape public opinion while escaping accountability.

 

Julia Hartley Brewer interview on Israel, Britain and the West

Jonathan Sacerdoti’s in‑depth interview with broadcaster Julia Hartley Brewer offers a strikingly direct look at the political, cultural, and moral pressures reshaping Britain, Israel, and the wider Western world. Drawing on her recent visit to Israel and her long experience in British media, Brewer speaks with unusual clarity about leadership, national identity, and the values liberal democracies must recover.

A World Growing More Chaotic

Brewer describes global politics as increasingly unmoored, with leaders who no longer resemble the steady figures of previous decades. She contrasts Donald Trump’s disruptive style with Keir Starmer’s bureaucratic caution, arguing that neither fits traditional expectations. Yet she notes that Trump’s unpredictability suits an unpredictable era. Her guiding principle is performance, not partisanship: praise what works, call out what doesn’t.

Israel, October 7, and Moral Clarity

Brewer’s strongest reflections come from her September visit to Israel, where she met families of hostages. The experience, she says, was “life‑changing.” She rejects claims of genocide in Gaza and argues that Israel has shown extraordinary restraint given the scale of the October 7 atrocities. She emphasises the IDF’s efforts to minimise civilian casualties, noting that many young soldiers died because of those precautions.

Netanyahu: Effective, Flawed, and Misunderstood

In this Julia Harley Brewer interview, she offers a balanced view of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. She acknowledges his political brilliance and strategic long‑term planning while recognising his flaws. She rejects attempts to pin October 7 solely on him, placing responsibility on Hamas. Her main criticism is Israel’s struggle in the information war, where she believes the government has failed to counter hostile narratives.

The West’s Crisis of Confidence

Brewer argues that Britain has been taught to be ashamed of its history and culture, weakening national cohesion. She distinguishes between multi‑racial societies, which she supports, and multi‑culturalism, which she believes has undermined shared values. British liberal norms—freedom of religion, freedom to marry, freedom to live openly—are, she argues, superior to cultures that deny these rights. Tolerance without limits, she warns, becomes self‑destructive.

Immigration, Security, and Hard Choices Ahead

Brewer calls for a serious national reset: investment in defence, stronger border control, civic training or national service, and mass deportations of illegal migrants. These measures, she argues, are necessary to restore social cohesion and national resilience. They are not punitive but protective, aimed at rebuilding a shared sense of duty and belonging.

What Britain Could Learn from Israel

Brewer speaks warmly of the community spirit she witnessed in Israel: positivity, duty, camaraderie, and a strong sense of shared purpose. Young Israelis returning from military service to spend weekends with family left a deep impression. She contrasts this with Britain’s fraying social fabric and argues that Israel’s model of civic responsibility could help rebuild British society.

The Media’s Narrow Bandwidth of Opinion

Brewer recounts her experiences with the BBC, describing a culture where producers privately agreed with her but feared professional consequences for saying so. She argues that British media has prioritised superficial diversity—identity categories—over genuine diversity of thought. This narrowing of acceptable opinion has contributed to public distrust and the silencing of dissenting voices.

A Conversation That Cuts Through the Noise

Sacerdoti’s interview with Julia Harley Brewer stands out for its honesty and refusal to indulge fashionable evasions. Brewer articulates what many in Britain and across the West feel but rarely hear in mainstream media: that liberal democratic values are worth defending, that Israel’s struggle is morally clear, and that Western societies must recover confidence in their own cultural foundations.

About Jonathan Sacerdoti

Jonathan Sacerdoti is a British journalist and broadcaster specialising in antisemitism, extremism, Middle Eastern affairs, and UK politics. He appears regularly on international news networks and hosts long‑form interviews exploring the cultural and political forces shaping the modern world.

About Julia Hartley Brewer

Julia Hartley Brewer is a prominent British radio and television presenter known for her forthright commentary, sharp political analysis, and defence of free expression. A leading voice on TalkTV and TalkRadio, she is recognised for her clear‑spoken support for Israel and her willingness to challenge prevailing orthodoxies in British media and politics.