The Moral Logic Behind the Strikes on Iran

Iranians and Israelis standing together in solidarity
Iranians and Israelis standing together in solidarity

Why the current attacks on Iran are illegal under international law but justifiable under Just War Theory. Read on to find out the moral logic of the strikes on Iran.

The Legal Frame: Why the Strikes Look Unlawful

International law is deliberately narrow. It allows force only when the UN Security Council authorises it or when a state is acting in self‑defence after an armed attack. Neither condition applies here. Iran had not launched a direct attack on US or Israeli territory, and no Security Council resolution was ever going to pass with Russia and China holding vetoes.

The Charter also prohibits regime change by force. Targeting political leadership crosses into the territory of the crime of aggression. On the legal ledger, the strikes are difficult to defend.

But legality is not the same as morality. And when a regime uses diplomacy as a shield, exports violence through proxies, and pursues long‑term existential goals, the moral analysis shifts.

Why Legality Isn’t the Whole Story

Just War Theory asks whether force is morally necessary to prevent grave harm. It evaluates intention, proportionality, last resort, and the nature of the threat. When applied to Iran, these criteria lead to a very different conclusion from the one international law reaches.

Iran’s post‑1979 regime is not a conventional authoritarian state. It is a revolutionary theocracy whose ideology mandates hostility toward Israel, the United States, and the West. This is not rhetorical theatre. It is written into the constitution, embedded in the IRGC’s mandate, and expressed through decades of proxy warfare.

The aggression is not episodic. It is structural.

A Regime Built for Exporting Conflict

Iran’s leadership has spent 45 years building a network of armed proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, Iraqi militias, Syrian militias, the Houthis—designed to encircle Israel and pressure the United States. These groups are not independent actors. They are instruments of Iranian strategy.

Alongside this, Iran has pursued a nuclear program marked by concealment, sanitised sites, undeclared facilities, and cooperation only when cornered. The IAEA’s reports over two decades show a consistent pattern: Iran advances its program when it can, slows it when pressured, and never fully discloses what it is doing.

Diplomacy becomes a tool for delay, not resolution. And every US election cycle offers a fresh opportunity to reset negotiations, stall for time, and wait for a more favourable administration.

This is not the behaviour of a state seeking coexistence. It is the behaviour of a state preparing for a future confrontation.

The Slow‑Burn Strategy

One of the most compelling interpretations of Iran’s behaviour is that it is pursuing a long‑term, slow‑burn strategy aimed at eventually confronting Israel and the United States on its own terms. That means avoiding premature war, building asymmetric capabilities, exploiting diplomatic cycles, and using negotiations to buy time.

A central pillar of this strategy is the pursuit of nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons function in geopolitics the way a queen functions on a chessboard: they change the entire geometry of the game. States with nuclear weapons are treated differently by the great powers. They gain immunity from regime‑threatening retaliation, freedom to escalate through proxies, and leverage to coerce neighbours.

Once a regime acquires a nuclear deterrent, removing it becomes exponentially harder.

Iran understands this. Its nuclear program is not a sprint; it is a deliberate crawl toward a position where it can no longer be coerced, contained, or confronted. Its restraint is not evidence of moderation. It is evidence of patience.

A regime that wants to survive in the short term but win in the long term behaves exactly like this: calibrated escalation, proxy warfare, nuclear hedging, and ideological consistency across generations.

If this interpretation is correct, the threat is existential even if not immediate.

How Just War Theory Responds to a Threat Like This

Just War Theory distinguishes between preventive war (not allowed) and pre‑emptive action (allowed when a real, advancing threat will soon become irreversible). A slow‑burn existential threat fits the second category when intentions are clear, the threat is growing, diplomacy is being used as deception, and waiting will make defence impossible.

Iran’s behaviour meets those conditions. Its ideology is explicitly hostile. Its proxies wage continuous low‑intensity war. Its nuclear program advances in the shadows. Its diplomacy is a stalling tactic timed to US election cycles. And its long‑term strategy appears aimed at a moment when it can fight from a position of strength.

Under these circumstances, the moral case for action becomes stronger than the legal one.

Does This Justify Regime Change?

Just War Theory allows regime change only when two demanding thresholds are met: the regime itself must be the instrument of aggression, and removing it must be necessary to prevent catastrophic harm.
Iran’s regime is not simply aggressive; it is built for aggression. Its ideology, institutions, and foreign policy are inseparable from its hostility toward Israel and the West. And if the regime is indeed pursuing a long‑term strategy aimed at eventual confrontation—anchored by a future nuclear deterrent—then waiting may simply allow the threat to mature into something irreversible.

In that reading, removing the regime is not imperial overreach. It is pre‑emptive defence against a danger that cannot be neutralised any other way.

Key Takeaway

International law and Just War Theory do not always point in the same direction. Legally, the recent strikes on Iran are difficult to justify. Morally, the case is far stronger. When a regime is ideologically committed to long‑term existential harm, uses proxies to wage continuous war, pursues nuclear capability as the queen on the geopolitical chessboard, and treats diplomacy as a stalling tactic timed to US election cycles, the moral obligation may shift from restraint to action. The uncomfortable truth is that the law may forbid what morality requires.

How Headlines help Anti‑Israel Bias Escape Scrutiny

Headline push Anti‑Israel Bias

Most people never read past a headline. In the age of scrolling, swiping, and instant reactions, the headline is the story for a huge share of the audience. It shapes the emotional response, sets the frame, and often becomes the public’s memory of the event, regardless of what the article actually says.

That is why headlines matter so much in reporting on Israel. And it is why complaints to the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) and the NZ Media Council so often fail, even when the headline is blatantly misleading or inflammatory.

A recent Stuff story is a perfect example.

The Stuff Headline That Does the Damage

Stuff ran the headline:

“Human rights experts join rising chorus that accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza.”

It is a headline designed to hit hard. It implies a growing, authoritative consensus. It frames Israel as a state facing a swelling global indictment. And it uses the most explosive word in the political vocabulary: genocide.

But the article itself tells a different story. Buried further down, readers learn that:

  • The International Court of Justice has not found Israel guilty of genocide.
  • The UN “experts” are not judges, not investigators, and do not speak for the UN as a whole.
  • The legal question is unresolved and contested.

A more accurate, less inflammatory headline could easily have been:

“UN-appointed experts repeat genocide allegations; legal bodies yet to rule.”

Same facts. Less heat. No distortion. But most readers never get that far. They see the headline, absorb the accusation, and move on.

Why Regulators Keep Saying “Not Guilty”

When NZFOI or others complain about biased headlines, the outcome is depressingly predictable. The BSA and Media Council almost always judge the entire article, not the headline that shaped public perception.

Their reasoning follows a familiar pattern:

  • A “reasonable reader” is assumed to read the whole article.
  • Headlines are allowed to be punchy or provocative.
  • Balance in the body text is treated as a cure for imbalance in the headline.

This approach made sense in the print era, when readers sat down with a newspaper and consumed the whole story. It makes no sense in a digital environment where headlines circulate independently on social media, often without any context at all.

The regulators are evaluating journalism as it exists on paper, not as it is consumed in the real world.

This allows headlines to help anti-Israel bias to escape scrutiny.

What the Research Shows About Headlines

Modern media research is unequivocal:

  • Many readers never click through to the article.
  • Emotional reactions occur at the headline level alone.
  • First impressions formed from headlines persist even when contradicted by the body.
  • Social media amplifies headlines in isolation, without nuance or context.

In other words, a fair body cannot fix a misleading headline. The harm has already happened.

This is especially true for Israel-related reporting, where words like “genocide,” “apartheid,” and “war crimes” carry enormous emotional weight and can inflame public sentiment instantly.

Why This Matters for Israel

Israel is uniquely vulnerable to headline distortion because:

  • Allegations are often presented as facts.
  • Headlines frequently omit legal context.
  • Nuance appears only deep in the article.
  • Social media spreads the headline, not the correction.

The Stuff headline is a textbook case. It primes readers to believe Israel is committing genocide, even though the article itself acknowledges that no court has made such a finding.

The headline becomes the verdict. The article becomes the footnote.

What Needs to Change

New Zealand’s media standards need to catch up with how news is actually consumed.

  • Headlines must be assessed as standalone communications. If the headline misleads, the complaint should be upheld, even if the body is balanced.
  • Newsrooms must stop using headlines as emotional weapons. Accuracy should not be sacrificed for clicks, especially on matters of war and public safety.
  • Regulators must recognise the real-world impact of framing. The “reasonable reader” of 2026 does not behave like the reader of 1996.

Until that happens, misleading headlines about Israel will continue to shape public opinion while escaping accountability.

 

The Francesca Albanese Problem: How a UN Mandate Creates Controversy by Design

Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, has become one of the most polarising figures in the UN system. Her public statements, especially since October 2023, have drawn sharp criticism from Israel, the United States, Germany, and other governments. Supporters praise her for speaking plainly about violations of international law; critics accuse her of overreach, partiality, and damaging the UN’s credibility.

But the deeper truth is this: the controversy around Albanese is not primarily about her personality or her politics. It is about a UN mandate that is structurally one‑directional, politically entrenched, and almost impossible to reform. She is operating exactly as the system was designed — and that design is what produces the tension.

Her most controversial statements

Albanese has made several high‑profile statements that triggered international backlash. The most contentious have been her repeated claims that Israel’s actions in Gaza amount to genocide or exhibit genocidal intent. This is especially sensitive because the International Court of Justice has not found Israel guilty of genocide; it has only ruled that South Africa’s claim is plausible enough to warrant provisional measures. Critics argue that Albanese’s language pre‑judges a legal question still before the Court. Supporters counter that her mandate requires her to assess violations as she sees them.

She has also accused Israel of practising apartheid, echoing the language used by several human rights organisations. But her most incendiary recent remark — describing Israel as “an enemy to humanity” — drew condemnation from multiple governments and UN member states. Critics argued that such language is incompatible with the restraint expected of someone widely perceived as a UN figure, even if technically she is not part of the UN bureaucracy. Supporters insisted she was speaking to the scale of civilian suffering and the obligations of international law.

She has further accused Western governments of enabling Israeli violations of international law, a framing that several states have condemned as politically inflammatory. And she has been criticised for not focusing on Hamas’s actions, including the 7 October attacks. Her response is consistent: the mandate does not authorise her to investigate Palestinian actors except insofar as they relate to Israel’s obligations as the occupying power.

Her communication style adds to the controversy. Albanese uses social media and public advocacy more actively than her predecessors, adopting a tone closer to activism than diplomacy. Whether one agrees with her or not, these statements have shaped her public profile — and they highlight the structural tension at the heart of her role.

How this mandate came about

To understand the controversy, it helps to understand the origins of the mandate itself. The Special Rapporteur on the OPT was created in 1993 by the UN Commission on Human Rights, at the height of the Oslo peace process. At the time, the international community believed a final settlement was within reach. The mandate was designed to monitor Israel’s conduct as the occupying power and assess compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.

The one‑directional nature of the mandate made sense in that moment. Israel was the occupying power; occupation law places obligations primarily on the occupier; Palestinian governance structures were still emerging; and the Oslo process was expected to resolve the conflict within a few years. The mandate was never intended to be permanent.

But when Oslo collapsed, Hamas took control of Gaza, and Palestinian governance fragmented, the mandate did not evolve. It remained frozen in its 1993 form, even as the political and legal landscape changed dramatically. A mechanism designed for a transitional period became a permanent fixture — and that is the root of today’s structural problem.

What evidence she relies on — without ever entering the territory

Another source of controversy is the fact that Albanese has never visited Gaza, the West Bank, or Israel during her tenure. In fact, no Special Rapporteur has been allowed entry since 2008. Israel has denied access to every mandate‑holder for nearly two decades, including Richard Falk, Makarim Wibisono, Michael Lynk, and now Albanese.

This means that Albanese’s assessments are based entirely on secondary evidence, which is standard UN practice when access is denied. Her sources include:

  • Interviews with victims, witnesses, humanitarian workers, and journalists
  • Reports from un agencies operating on the ground (unrwa, ocha, who, unicef)
  • Satellite imagery and open‑source intelligence
  • Documentation from ngos such as human rights watch, amnesty international, b’tselem, and others
  • Verified media footage and geolocated videos
  • Legal submissions from states and experts
  • Decades of prior un findings and resolutions

This is how most UN human rights investigations operate when a state blocks access. But it also means her conclusions reflect her interpretation of evidence she cannot personally verify on the ground. That distinction is often lost in public debate, and it feeds the perception that her statements — including genocide, apartheid, and “enemy to humanity” — are not grounded in direct observation.

Why she is not required to be neutral

This is the point most often misunderstood by the public. Special Rapporteurs are not UN staff. They are independent experts, unpaid by the UN, and not representatives of the Secretary‑General. They are not bound by diplomatic neutrality. Their job is to investigate, assess, and report — not to mediate or balance competing narratives.

The mandate itself is explicitly one‑directional. It instructs the Rapporteur to examine Israel’s conduct as the occupying power. It does not instruct the Rapporteur to investigate Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, or Palestinian armed groups except in relation to Israel’s obligations. Impartiality, in this context, refers to method, not symmetry. The Rapporteur must apply international law consistently, but is not required to distribute criticism evenly.

This is why her reports — and those of her predecessors — appear one‑sided. The mandate itself is one‑sided.

How this affects the UN’s reputation

Here lies the core dilemma. The UN as an institution must be neutral and impartial. Special Rapporteurs are not required to be neutral or impartial. Most people do not understand the difference.

When Albanese makes strong statements — including calling Israel “an enemy to humanity” — many assume the UN itself is taking a position. Her statements are her own, not the UN’s institutional stance. But the reputational damage is real because the distinction between “UN official” and “independent expert” is not intuitive. The conflict is highly polarised, her rhetoric is unusually direct, and the mandate itself is structurally asymmetric. The result is a persistent perception that the UN is biased, even when the system is functioning exactly as designed.

How previous Rapporteurs handled the same tension

Every person who has held this mandate has faced the same structural problem. John Dugard was blunt and legalistic, emphasising that the mandate required one‑directional scrutiny. Richard Falk adopted an activist tone that generated significant controversy and was denied entry by Israel. Makarim Wibisono tried to soften the asymmetry but resigned when Israel refused him access, stating that the mandate prevented him from being impartial. Michael Lynk was more measured and academic, but still sharply critical of Israel. Albanese is more public and assertive than her predecessors, and her communication style amplifies the structural tension rather than softening it.

The pattern is clear: the controversy is built into the mandate, not the individual.

Why the mandate has never been rebalanced

Reforming the mandate would require a majority vote in the UN Human Rights Council. That has never happened — and likely never will. The Council is polarised, with a large bloc of states supporting the existing mandate. Western states criticise the mandate but rarely act, lacking the votes to change it. Israel does not engage with the process, viewing the HRC as biased. For many states, the mandate serves political purposes. The political cost of reform outweighs the benefit. The result is a mandate that persists by political inertia, not by design quality.

What could be done

Several theoretical reforms exist. The mandate could be rewritten to include all parties, though this is politically unlikely. A broader human rights mechanism could replace it, or a parallel mandate could be created to examine Palestinian authorities. The UN could also improve public communication, making clearer the distinction between institutional positions and independent expert opinions. Rapporteurs themselves could adopt more diplomatic communication styles, though that depends entirely on the individual.

Key Takeaway

Francesca Albanese is controversial, but she is not an anomaly. She is the predictable product of a mandate that is structurally asymmetric, politically entrenched, and widely misunderstood. Her statements — including her claim that Israel is “an enemy to humanity” — generate reputational tension for the UN not because she is violating the rules, but because the rules themselves create a clash between independent investigation and public expectations of neutrality. Until the mandate is rebalanced — or at least better explained — every future Rapporteur will face the same storm.

Australia’s Hate‑Speech Debate and the Lessons Hidden in History

Australia Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has authorised a Royal Commission in the aftermath of the Bondi Massacre. The Bondi Massacre has renewed calls for Hate-Speech Laws to be passed.

Australia’s renewed push to strengthen hate‑speech laws, after the Bondi Massacre, has stirred up a familiar conversation across the Tasman. Whenever one democracy tightens the boundaries of acceptable speech, its neighbours inevitably ask themselves the same questions: What exactly are we trying to prevent? Do these laws work? And how do we avoid repeating the mistakes of the past?

To answer those questions, it helps to step back and look at the long, winding history of how societies have tried to regulate dangerous speech — from medieval blasphemy laws to modern hate‑speech statutes — and how New Zealand found itself wrestling with these issues in recent years.

Before “Hate Speech”: The Era of Proto‑Laws

Long before anyone coined the phrase “hate speech,” societies were already policing words. But the targets were very different from today.

Early speech restrictions were designed to protect the powerful, not the vulnerable. Medieval and early‑modern Europe punished blasphemy, heresy, and insults to monarchs. Sedition laws protected the state. Public‑order laws punished speech that threatened stability. These weren’t hate‑speech laws — but they were the ancestors of modern speech regulation. They recognised that words could inflame, destabilise, or provoke violence.

They were, in a sense, proto–hate speech laws: early attempts to control dangerous expression, but aimed at shielding institutions and dominant religions rather than minority communities.

Weimar Germany: A Warning From the Middle Ground

By the early 20th century, democracies began experimenting with laws that looked closer to what we recognise today. The Weimar Republic had statutes against inciting hatred, insulting religious communities, and spreading inflammatory propaganda. These laws were used — sporadically — against Hitler and the Nazi Party.

But they were weak, inconsistently enforced, and applied by courts often sympathetic to nationalist rhetoric. They failed not because the idea of regulating incitement was flawed, but because the state enforcing them was collapsing.

This failure became a turning point. After the war, the world understood that propaganda and dehumanising rhetoric weren’t abstract harms — they were precursors to genocide.

After the Holocaust: The Birth of Modern Hate‑Speech Law

Modern hate‑speech laws are a post‑WWII creation. Germany led the way with strict bans on Nazi symbols, Holocaust denial, and incitement against groups. These laws influenced the European Convention on Human Rights, UN anti‑racism conventions, and the frameworks adopted by Canada, the UK, and others.

For the first time, speech regulation was designed to protect vulnerable minorities, not the state or the dominant religion. The moral logic was clear: if hateful propaganda helped pave the road to genocide, democracies had a duty to intervene earlier.

But even with this moral clarity, the practical challenges remained.

The Drafting Dilemma: Why Hate‑Speech Laws Are So Hard to Get Right

Even supporters of hate‑speech laws acknowledge the same recurring problems.

Definitions are slippery.
Words like “hatred,” “insult,” and “hostility” are subjective. What one person sees as critique, another sees as bigotry.

Enforcement can become political.
Police and courts must interpret emotional concepts. That opens the door to inconsistency — or misuse.

Ideas are not people.
Laws should protect individuals from harm, not shield belief systems from criticism. When religion becomes a protected category, the line between hate‑speech law and blasphemy law can blur quickly.

Effectiveness is mixed.
Countries with strong hate‑speech laws still experience rising extremism. The laws can reduce public displays of hate, but they rarely change underlying prejudice.

These tensions are exactly what Australia is grappling with now — and what New Zealand confronted recently.

New Zealand’s High‑Threshold Approach

New Zealand has some of the narrowest hate‑speech laws in the democratic world. Under the Human Rights Act 1993, only racial incitement is covered. The threshold is high: the speech must be threatening, abusive, or insulting and likely to incite hostility or contempt.

Religion, gender, sexuality, disability, and political belief are not included. Most offensive or hateful speech is not illegal unless it crosses into threats, harassment, or incitement to violence — all of which are already covered by the Crimes Act and other statutes.

This approach reflects a strong cultural preference for free expression and a reluctance to criminalise attitudes rather than actions.

The Push to Add Religion — And Why It Backfired

After the Christchurch mosque attacks, the Royal Commission recommended expanding hate‑speech protections to include religion. The government proposed amending the Human Rights Act so that “insulting” or “hostile” speech about religious groups could become a criminal offence.

The reaction was swift and intense.

Critics warned that criminalising “insults” to religion risked creating a de facto blasphemy law — just two years after New Zealand had formally repealed its old blasphemy offence. The concern wasn’t abstract. Around the world, laws protecting religion from “insult” have been used to:

  • Suppress theological disagreement
  • Silence ex‑believers
  • Chill academic study of comparative religion
  • Shield harmful practices from scrutiny
  • Protect ideas instead of people

Public submissions overwhelmingly argued that the proposal would undermine open debate, academic freedom, and the ability to challenge belief systems — all essential in a pluralistic society.

In the end, the Law Commission declined to include hate‑speech reform in its work programme, and the government withdrew the proposal entirely.

What Australia Can Learn From New Zealand’s Experience

Australia’s debate is unfolding in a global context where hate‑speech laws are common but their effectiveness is mixed. The New Zealand experience offers a quiet but important lesson: even well‑intentioned reforms can stumble when they risk suppressing legitimate debate, especially around religion.

The challenge is not whether to protect vulnerable communities — everyone agrees on that. The challenge is how to do it without sliding back into the old pattern of protecting belief systems from criticism, the very thing modern democracies have spent decades moving away from.

If Australia wants to avoid repeating history — both ancient and modern — it will need to draft with extraordinary care, clear thresholds, and a firm commitment to protecting people rather than ideas.

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What Anti-Zionism Really Is

We came across this thought provoking article and realised its importance in documenting this new evolutionary step of Antisemitism to become “Anti-Zionism.”

After October 7, friends called me ‘filthy Zionist.’ Longtime colleagues refused to work with me. This isn’t criticism of Israel. It’s about making Jews pariahs. By Adam Louis-Klein, 10.07.25 —Israel

After three months in a remote Amazonian village with no internet or phone signal, I returned to a small Colombian town on October 9, 2023—still in the rainforest, but now with internet—and checked social media for the first time. The jungle was still in my ears—squawking macaws, torrential rain, the low hum of a generator—when my screen filled with images from another world entirely: young people sprinting through dust and gunfire at the Nova music festival in Israel.

I had crossed between worlds, only to find that the world I returned to was no longer the same.

The deeper shock came in the hours that followed, as I scrolled through the reactions of friends and colleagues. Denial, justification, and open hostility toward anyone who expressed care for Israelis. I typed a simple phrase—Am Yisrael Chai, “the people of Israel live”—and learned that, in my circles of left-wing academia, that too was considered an act of aggression.

Almost immediately, I saw that a colleague had commented with a photo of people burning an Israeli flag. A former friend declared that my words revealed me as nothing but a “filthy Zionist.” Longtime intellectual collaborators informed me it was unacceptable to work with me given my support for the Jewish people. For them, even calling Jews a “people” was offensive and “right-wing.”

In the days following October 7, I was already experiencing what Marion Kaplan, in her study of Jewish life under Nazi Germany, terms “social death”—complete ostracization and the cutting of one’s previous social bonds. I was beginning to understand that to be a Jewish intellectual—to be a person who speaks in a Jewish voice, and who sees his fate as bound up in the collective fate of the Jewish people—was simply not something the academy could accept.

But I wasn’t about to submit. I knew that Jewishness was as legitimate a site as any identity from which to think, reason, and argue.

That was two long years ago. I have learned much in refusing to submit. Not just about the marginalization of Jews in the universities of the West, but about the enduring value of distinct peoples and voices—even in the face of a powerful ideological movement that uses the language of pluralism to conceal its demand for total conformity.

The Anti-Zionist Worldview

I had always been a good student. At my prep school, we read Antigone in Greek and the Aeneid in Latin. At Yale, I worked my way through the Western canon, from Aristotle to Hannah Arendt, in the Directed Studies program.

I first became an anthropologist because I was searching for something beyond the Western philosophical tradition I had studied. I wanted to understand worlds that were not my own. What I didn’t quite understand was that the twenty-first-century academy would demand that I disavow my own.

By the time I began my PhD, I was fully immersed in the critical, anti-colonial thought that now dominates the academy—an orientation bent on interrogating and dismantling the West. But living alongside the Desana, an indigenous group in Brazil and Colombia, ultimately brought me back—back to an embrace of my own Judaism and back to my Western inheritance as one tradition among others. Instead of thinking against the West, I came to see the value of thinking across civilizations, between living peoples and the worlds they continue to sustain.

The Desana of the Vaupés region, in today’s Brazil and Colombia, are often described as marginal to the global economy. But in their own eyes, they stand at the center of the universe—a chosen people with a unique story. They call themselves the Ümücori Masa, the universe-people, descended from the universe-person, or God.

For them, chosenness simply means peoplehood. In the early twentieth century, Catholic missionaries destroyed their traditional longhouses and forced them into mission towns. The surrounding Spanish-speaking society showed little interest in their memory or survival. In response, the Desana have fought to preserve their sacred names and endure as a people.

In the same way in which antisemitism once cast the Jew as the world’s metaphysical enemy, anti-Zionism now casts Israel and its supporters in the same role.

Today, we work together to translate old texts about the Desana into their own language—restoring the name of their God, re-centering their sacred lineages, and helping turn the historical record into a living part of their future.

Their struggle to remain themselves in the face of erasure echoed 3,000 years of Jewish history and what I found on my return: a so-called liberal world where Jewish distinctiveness is no longer tolerated, where Jewish continuity is recoded as a threat, where Jewish power is seen as illegitimate.

Nowhere is that worldview more powerful than in the academy. There, educated elites are being taught that it is righteous to hate Jews.

They call that world view anti-Zionism.

While anti-Zionism introduces itself as a “political opinion,” I came to see that it was something else entirely. Anti-Zionism, like antisemitism, is an entire cosmology. In the same way in which antisemitism once cast the Jew as the world’s metaphysical enemy, anti-Zionism now casts Israel and its supporters in the same role.

I began to study anti-Zionism the way I might study any culture’s system of meaning: its myths, rituals, and taboos. It functioned as a symbolic system, its force drawn from recurring metaphors—genocide, settler-colonialism, apartheid—ritually deployed not to clarify but to accuse, forming a closed circuit of moral judgment, reproduced across academia, media, and international organizations.

A major mistake would be to think that anti-Zionism is opposition to Zionism as an actually existing political ideology. Instead, it constructs a fantasy “Zionism” as a cosmic symbol of global injustice itself, one in which every possible crime—including U.S. police violence, trans exclusion9/11, even the climate crisis—converges in the image of Israel’s evil.

The central operation of anti-Zionism is libel. Anti-Zionists bypass the charge of antisemitism by redirecting their defamation at Israel and “Zionists” rather than Jews. By repeating accusations without serious demonstration or credible sourcing, they produce the appearance of an incontestable reality: a displaced evil attributed to “Israel.”

Anti-Zionists repeatedly claim that they are simply criticizing Israel. What makes the difference between critique and libel is not what is said, but how it is proffered, whether it belongs in the space of reason—answerable to refutation—or travels merely through repetition.

People who have been targeted by anti-Zionism know the difference. They are not reacting to individual opinions but to an organized movement that marks Jews as suspect through their association with a libeled Israel. The common deflection—that Jews “assume” criticism of Israel is antisemitic because they believe in some “inherent link” between Israel and all Jews—misses the point entirely.

The central operation of anti-Zionism is libel. Anti-Zionists bypass the charge of antisemitism by redirecting their defamation at Israel and “Zionists” rather than Jews.

In truth, it is a projection by those uncomfortable with being called antisemitic, who may not understand how anti-Zionism actually works—as a closed system of accusation, designed to force Jews to disavow their identities.

What makes anti-Zionism so seductive in academia is the way it cloaks itself in the moral language of human rights. Words like decolonizationanti-racism, and solidarity circulate as moral currencies, exchanged for prestige and authority in the academy. Yet behind this pose of inclusion, anti-Zionism works as an exclusionary ritual.

For example, when I proposed hosting a single academic talk at my university, McGill, on the antisemitic genealogies of anti-Zionism, particularly on the Soviet roots of so much of today’s anti-Israel sloganeering—amid at least 10 events in my department on the so-called Gaza genocide—my request was denied without explanation.

Another colleague warned that the journal I worked on would become “untenable” if it published anything that spoke positively about Jews. The perspective rooted in Jewish peoplehood was simply not to be part of the conversation.

The Forgotten History

To understand how the anti-Zionist worldview took hold, we have to look at the history it so carefully avoids. For a movement so obsessed with historical injustice, it remains almost entirely ignorant of its own origins.

But its genealogy is not mysterious, if you care to look.

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, collaborated with the Nazis, met with Hitler, and broadcast antisemitic propaganda to the Arab world. Husseini worked closely with the Muslim Brotherhood, one of whose offshoots eventually became Hamas.

GettyImages-1371380021.jpg
Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, inspecting Bosnian volunteers of the Waffen SS while giving the Nazi salute, 1941. (History/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Following Israel’s victory over the Arab League in the Six-Day War of 1967, the Soviet Union took up the cause. Their strategy was clear: After the Soviet proxies lost on the physical battlefield, they turned to ideological and information warfare.

As Izabella Tabarovsky and others have documented, Soviet “Zionology” turned classical antisemitism into a global discourse of liberation. Zionism was no longer a Jewish national movement of Jewish liberation, but rather, a world conspiracy of “U.S-Israeli stooges” to undermine socialism and Third World revolution. Zionism was cast as a form of “Jewish imperialism”—a term with Nazi origins—and Israel as the world’s moral pariah.

Inside the Soviet Union, the consequences were stark. Jews were barred from emigrating to Israel, Hebrew was outlawed, and Jewish cultural associations were shuttered. Those who persisted were arrested and tried as “spies” or “traitors” to socialism. To live openly as a Jew, to insist on belonging to the Jewish people, was recast as political criminality—a climate that echoes in today’s elite institutions. These Jews became known as refuseniks: refused visas to Israel, but also refusing to submit to an anti-Zionist regime determined to crush their Jewish spirit.

Born out of the alliance between Nazism and Islamism, the rhetoric that was adopted by the Soviets ultimately found a global audience through the UN and its web of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In 2001, at the United Nations World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, these ideas went mainstream—thanks to a decades-long campaign by Arab nationalist regimes, Soviet propagandists, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an umbrella group for the Muslim-majority states within the United Nations. The NGO forum revived the Soviet slogan “Zionism is racism,” circulated leaflets comparing Israel to Nazi Germany, and helped cement the “apartheid” libel in progressive discourse.

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The Jewish Demonstration in front of Moscow’s Lenin Library on May 29, 1988, on the first day of the Gorbachev-Reagan summit. (Vitaly Armand/AFP via Getty Images)

This is how antisemitism got repackaged in the moral idiom of human rights. The tropes migrated across different aesthetics and discourses—Nazi, Islamist, Soviet, and now the postcolonial left—each time repositioning “Zionism” as the axis of global evil. What started as Nazism became human rights, while Zionists—the modern name of Jews—were recast as “the new Nazis.”

The Genocide Libel

 

Nowhere is the logic of anti-Zionist accusation more stark than in the charge that Israel is committing genocide. This claim also dates back to Soviet propaganda in the 1970s—and within days of October 7, it was being triumphantly revived by activist professors across the West. Having reframed Jewish peoplehood as inherently oppressive, anti-Zionism seeks to criminalize it altogether—by redefining Israel’s very being as genocide: the “crime of crimes.”

This maneuver rests not just on propaganda, but on explicit efforts to rewrite international law. A small circle of academics has worked nonstop over the past two years to erase the distinction between war and genocide. Dirk Moses, editor of the Journal of Genocide Research—which in 2024 devoted an entire issue to accusing Israel—has argued for abandoning genocide’s core requirement of intent to destroy a people. In its place, he proposes that all “settler-colonial” states are guilty by definition. Within this logic, Israel does not need to commit extermination to be genocidal; it is guilty simply for being.

While millions today are told that a “majority of genocide experts” believe Israel is committing genocide, few realize that this supposed consensus rests on a very small circle of academics whose self-avowed project is to redefine and even abolish the concept of genocide itself.

Meanwhile, another group of scholars, including leading experts on antisemitism, have rejected the genocide libel outright. Yet their voices receive virtually no coverage in the mainstream press, which prefers the spectacle of accusation to the discipline of debate—excluding Jews from the conversation unless they serve as tokens to legitimize anti-Zionism.

Legal scholar Avraham Russell Shalev, for example, has argued that October 7 itself meets the legal threshold for genocide, given Hamas’s clear intent to annihilate Israeli Jews. He also notes that genocidal actors have often made reverse accusations—a pattern seen with the Nazis, the Serbs, and the Hutus.

Anti-Zionism is not a spontaneous reaction to Israeli policy. It is a symbolic ideology with a specific history. Its moral authority depends not on truth, but on inversion—of victims and aggressors, of genocide and self-defense. It thrives not through argument, but through erasure. This is its deepest function: to delegitimize the Jewish claim to peoplehood by refashioning an old hatred in the language of justice.

What Indigenous Really Means

To truly understand anti-Zionism, we must examine what it seeks to erase: the indigenous connection between the Jewish people and the land of Israel.

Anti-Zionism construes Jews as “colonizers”: an alien, outsider presence in the Middle East. The colonizer libel not only erases Jewish belonging, but enlists Jews as scapegoats for everything modern Western culture now seeks to disavow: racism, imperial violence, settler domination.

In the months following October 7—while still engaged in my work with the Desana people in the Amazon—I set out to peel back the ideological layers wrapped around this fashionable term and recover what indigeneity really means.

At bottom, indigeneity is simply a way of being a people, one in which land and lineage are braided together at the root of identity itself. For the Desana, peoplehood is inseparable from the Vaupés River and the sacred sites along its banks. Their ancestors are said to have arrived upriver in a snake-shaped canoe, guided by primordial beings, who established the clan houses from which souls are born and to which they return.

In today’s academy, however, indigeneity has been reduced to a claim of victimhood at the hands of European colonialism. It is fundamentally a reactive identity—defined only in opposition to “white settler” power. This narrowing of meaning flattens the richness of civilizational difference. By this logic, Jews—now cast as symbols of whiteness, empire, and Western dominance—are excluded in advance.

Indigeneity has been reduced to a claim of victimhood at the hands of European colonialism. It is fundamentally a reactive identity—defined only in opposition to “white settler” power.

Such a framework cannot account for histories of conquest and displacement carried out by non-Europeans. The Arab conquests of the seventh century reshaped the Middle East and North Africa in ways that perfectly fit the “settler-colonial” model now applied to Israel. As Egyptian Jewish historian Bat Ye’or has shown, these conquests suppressed local languages, marginalized non-Muslim peoples, and absorbed indigenous populations into an imperial order—not unlike the Catholic missions in the Amazon.

Yet none of this fits the fashionable narrative. So it is ignored.

Anti-Zionism erases the Jewish story by casting Jews as foreign oppressors. Yet that story is one of exile and return: from Ur to Canaan, from Egypt back to the land of Israel, and after centuries of dispersion, return again. Indigeneity, in this fuller sense, is not a reactive label for the colonized but a structure of peoplehood—a way of inhabiting place, memory, and time.

The Desana, too, tell of a great migration—from the mouth of the Amazon upriver to the Vaupés, where the world took form. For the Desana, to belong is to descend from a journey and to return to its source. What the Desana are to the Vaupés, the Jews are to the land of Israel: a people at the center.

The Space of Reason

I had gone to the Amazon to learn how a people could live at the center of their own world—defined not by others, but by their own destiny. I came back to the erasure of my own.

In all of the spaces I had once thought of as home—universities, cultural institutions, humanitarian NGOs—an ideology that demands the erasure of me and my people has taken hold.

Anti-Zionism’s spread through the institutions of our liberal democracy is a test case for whether equality and justice can survive once they’ve been hollowed out and turned into weapons of exclusion.

This is not only about academia, and it is certainly not only about Jews. It is about defending the right of any people to exist as themselves, to live in security, and to speak in their own voice.

If we fail to defend those basic values, the future will belong to those who erase entire peoples from the human story, twisting the language of justice into tools of violence, intimidation, and propaganda. We cannot let that happen.

The right of every people to stand in the space of reason—to speak, to be heard, and to be recognized as equals—is not a gift from the powerful. It is the birthright of humanity.

 

Enoch Lavendar: Hanukkah 2025

ICYMI or you’d just like to hear Enoch’s very personal Hanukkah message presented at our December meeting in Christchurch, you can watch it here.

Joint Statement in Response to Government Declaration on Gaza

Winston Peters, Minister of Foreign Affairs for New Zealand
Winston Peters, NZ Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs

We, the undersigned organisations, express grave concern over the recent  joint declaration by New Zealand and 24 other nations condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza and accusing it of obstructing humanitarian aid.

This statement is not only misguided, it represents a dangerous inversion of reality, in which:

  • Terrorists are excused, and defenders are condemned;
  • Hamas’s propaganda is cited as fact, and verified Israeli efforts are ignored;
  • The thief is pitied, and those delivering food under fire are vilified.
     

Blaming the Rescuers, Not the Arsonists

The joint statement accuses Israel of “inhumane” killing and “drip-feeding” aid. Yet it is Hamas (the very group that started this war with a massacre on October 7 2023) that:

  • Steals aid, sells it, and redistributes it to fighters;
  • Creates disturbances and fires on civilians at aid stations to induce panic and lay blame on Israel;
  • Places bounties on aid workers not under its control.
     

To accuse Israel of causing the humanitarian crisis while ignoring Hamas’s central role is to blame the firefighter for the fire. Israel has worked hard to coordinate necessary aid to the extent that there are currently hundreds of truckloads of food on the Gaza side of the border in need of distribution. Thus, there is no “drip-feeding” by Israel.

Treating Terrorist Casualty Reports as Gospel

The casualty numbers cited (tens of thousands of “civilians” killed) come directly from Hamas’s so-called “Gaza Health Ministry.” This is not a neutral medical authority. It is:

  • A Hamas-run information weapon, whose sole aim is to inflate civilian casualties;
  • A notoriously unreliable source. Due to inconsistencies the UN has quietly revised its own reporting;
  • Completely opaque and unverifiable, with no distinction between combatants and civilians.
     

When governments like New Zealand cite these figures without context or scrutiny, they lend credibility to terrorists and undermine genuine humanitarian reporting.

Condemning What Works, Ignoring What Fails

While condemning Israel, the joint statement says nothing about the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) — the one aid mechanism that actually works:

  • GHF delivers aid using vetted drivers, uses GPS tracking and bypass routes around Hamas.
  • It ensures direct civilian access to food and medicine.
  • It has faced threats and sabotage from Hamas, and—most shockingly—refusal to cooperate from UN agencies and NGOs.
     

According to a Times of Israel report (22 July 2025), these agencies have declined GHF’s repeated offers to collaborate, even as they lament “lack of access” and blame Israel. This is not humanitarianism — it is institutional dysfunction.

Calling for Ceasefire While Hostages Rot in Tunnels

The joint statement demands an “immediate, unconditional ceasefire.” But what kind of ceasefire:

  • Leaves 50 hostages in captivity?
  • Enables Hamas to rearm, reorganise, and repeat the horrors of October 7?
  • Forbids Israel from dismantling a terror regime that uses civilians as shields and hospitals as bases?
     

A ceasefire without the above conditions does not end the war. It guarantees the next one.

When Hamas Applauds You, Something Is Wrong

That Hamas has celebrated the joint statement should alarm every signatory. If your position is being used by a terrorist group as vindication, it is time to re-examine whose reality you are serving.

Why does NZ side with terrorists, when a tiny western style democratic state the size of Northland fights an existential defensive war? Israel did not start this war. She has an obligation to defend her citizens, to do everything possible to free the hostages and to protect her people from future 7 October style massacres. 

What Must Happen Now

We urge the New Zealand Government and its partners to:

  1. Withdraw or amend the joint statement, explicitly naming Hamas as the source of Gaza’s suffering;
  2. Publicly support the GHF and demand cooperation from UN and NGO agencies obstructing its work;
  3. Reject the inversion of truth, where democracies are condemned and terror groups are given a free pass;
  4. Recognise that Israel is fighting an existential war, and that peace is not possible if a genocidal terror regime is left in place;
  5. Demand the immediate release of all hostages and urge Hamas to accept the ceasefire.
     

A Final Word: Reality Must Be Respected

This is not a war between equals. It is a fight between a democracy that warns civilians and a death cult that hides behind them. Between those who seek peace and those who glorify death.

Reversing that truth is not diplomacy. It is betrayal.

We call on New Zealand to return to moral clarity — and stop legitimising the lies of Hamas.

Dr David Cumin, Greg Bouwer – Israel Institute NZ
Dr Sheree Trotter – Indigenous Embassy Jerusalem
Nigel Woodley – Coalition of Ministers, Protection of Zion Trust 
Derek McDowell – International Christian Embassy Jerusalem 
Rob Berg – Kol Israel 
Yifat Goddard, Ashley Church – Israel NZ Network 
Dennis Mcleod – Christian Friends of Israel
Bryce Turner – Christians for Israel 
Tony Kan – NZ Friends of Israel Association
Beth Mather – Bridges for Peace

 

The latest newsletter is out!

Masthead of NZ Friends of Israel Assoc Inc Newsletter

The latest newsletter is out and it may be downloaded from here: February Newsletter.

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Rape as a tool of war

ICYMI…

Bari Weiss interviews Sheryl Sandberg about her documentary about October 7, “Screams Before the Silence.”

“The most stunning thing about sexual violence is that it is the most effective tool of war for two reasons:  The first, it’s just effective, you rape women and sometimes their husbands then don’t want to be with them, you tear apart society, they’re carrying babies of their rapists.  What happens then?  …And its free, it’s free, you don’t have to buy a bomb, a rocket, a gun, it’s free, so you can totally terrorize a nation.”